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ABSTRACT 
 Providing border security has not always been a priority of nation-states in Latin 
America. As the wars of independence created legitimate armies, governments began 
using their forces for border protection to encapsulate a collective identity. The problem 
lies in Latin America’s soft borders. Some countries unwillingly harbor the transportation 
of illicit drug and human traffickers, illegal logging and mineral extraction operations, 
poachers, and individuals willing to harm indigenous people to achieve their illegitimate 
objectives. Another concern is travelers fleeing failed states, as witnessed at the borders 
of Mexico-Guatemala, Colombia-Ecuador, and Venezuela. The 4.6 million people who 
have fled Venezuela have traversed into adjacent nations. This does not account for the 
1.3 million migrants who have crossed illegally to bypass national entry points, in fear of 
rejection. A way to better manage border crossings is through smart border systems. This 
thesis evaluates whether smart borders alter the geopolitics of borderlands and how the 
most advanced use of border management influences stability or instability in the 
Western Hemisphere. This thesis uses an exploratory design to qualitatively evaluate 
evolving border environments. The data relied on for this research encompassed border 
crossing metrics, traffic management and mitigation, entry point vulnerabilities, the smart 
border technologies used, and the effectiveness of these technologies against border 
threats. 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS QUESTION 
How do smart border technologies alter the geopolitics of the borderlands and 
contribute to stability or instability in the Western Hemisphere? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND HYPOTHESIS  
Establishing robust border security policies has not always been a priority of nation-
states in Latin America. The earliest notion of territorial boundary management and 
protection began in the 19th century. As the wars of independence created legitimate 
armies, governments began using their forces for border protection to encapsulate a 
collective identity.1 These actions granting political sovereignty to the people continued 
through the 20th into the 21st century. Portions of Latin America continue to focus on 
border security in response to migration control, which was not a priority in the past. 
Current border instabilities in Central and South America are beginning to change 
due to host country actions in the region. The problem lies in Latin American soft border 
regions such as Mexico-Guatemala, Colombia-Ecuador, and Venezuela, which contribute 
to a situation of uncontrolled entry for entities willing to cause harm and others searching 
for basic human rights.2 Border security policies have been described as a major obstacle 
for regional and hemispheric threats and the transferring of illicit goods; however, creating 
a secure boundary and maintaining its integrity is a challenge.3 The traffic pattern in certain 
regions can be the driving factor behind border crossings. Some countries unwillingly 
harbor the transportation of illicit drug traffickers, illegal logging and mineral extraction 
 
1 Edgardo A. Manero, “Strategic Representations, Territory and Border Areas: Latin America and 
Global Disorder,” Geopolitics 12, no. 1 (2007): 22–3, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
14650040601031123?casa_token=XUBl2kciVyMAAAAA%3AS8-
v4pssaKcicjwhtIKsTXn8iQ7Svs6G3Hu8mhmiFsNXGkRaigYrDyT2ZlqBT6l55qrqL2LRPoL_Ctk. 
2 David Pion-Berlin, “Latin America’s Growing Security Gap,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 1 
(January 2011): 39–53, https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/412892. 
3 “Border Management,” United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, accessed 
January 24, 2020, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/border-control/. 
2 
operations, human traffickers, poachers, and individuals willing to harm indigenous people 
to achieve their illegitimate objectives.4 Another concern is travelers fleeing failed states, 
as witnessed at the borders of Mexico-Guatemala, Colombia-Ecuador, and Venezuela.5 
The 4.6 million people who have fled Venezuela have traversed into nations like Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru.6 This vast number of refugees who were accepted into adjacent nation-
states do not account for those 1.3 million who have crossed illegally to bypass national 
entry points in fear of rejection.7 Some responsibility lies with the host country. If 
Colombia is not aware of these refugees, they cannot provide them with basic human rights. 
To effectively monitor these borders for threats and humanitarian assistance, states must 
consider alternative methods of border control, including surveillance technologies as force 
multipliers to assist border agents in detecting borderland penetrations. 
One way to manage crossings is through border control points. Control point areas 
determine if a crossing is licit or illicit, and permit only those considered eligible and non-
threatening to enter the country. In a perfect scenario, all entities would travel through these 
checkpoints, allowing the receiving nation the ability to determine eligibility; however, 
that does not always occur. Border security vulnerabilities lie in regions that are not 
continuously monitored. Managing porous land, maritime, and air borders can be 
 
4 “Murder of Brazilian indigenous leader a ‘worrying symptom’ of land invasion,” UN News, last 
modified July 29, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1043401; S. D. Chicas , K. Omine , B. 
Arevalo , J. B. Ford , K. Sugimura, “Deforestation Along the Maya Mountain Massif Belize-Guatemala 
Border,” International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing & Spatial Information Sciences 
41 (2016), https://www.int-arch-photogramm-remote-sens-spatial-inf-sci.net/XLI-B8/597/2016/isprs-
archives-XLI-B8-597-2016.pdf. 
5 Michele Shedlin, Carlos Decena, Hugo Noboa, and Óscar Betancourt, “Sending-Country Violence 
and Receiving-Country Discrimination: Effects on the Health of Colombian Refugees in Ecuador,” Journal 
of Immigrant and Minority Health 16, no. 1 (February 2014): 119–24, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-013-
9777-9; U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Taskforce, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies U.C. San Diego, 
U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation 2018–2024, (La Jolla, CA: University of California San Diego, 2018), 
https://usmex.ucsd.edu/_files/Whitepaper_Security_Taskforce_March_26_Covers.pdf; United Nations, 
World Health Organization Region of Americas (2018): 11, https://www.who.int/migrants/publications/
PAHO-report.pdf?ua=1. 
6 Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, “Venezuelan Refugee Crisis to Become the Largest and Most 
Underfunded in Modern History,” The Brookings Institution, December 9, 2019, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/12/09/venezuela-refugee-crisis-to-become-the-largest-and-
most-underfunded-in-modern-history/. 
7 Adam Veitch, “Colombia cracks down on illegal migration from Venezuela,” Colombia Reports, 
June 11, 2019, https://colombiareports.com/colombia-cracks-down-on-illegal-migration-from-venezuela/.  
3 
challenging, but is necessary for stopping national and international threats.8 Latin 
America is a region known for its soft borders and easy access to neighboring countries.9 
Although Argentina does not call the northern border with Bolivia, Paraguay, and 
Brazil a smart border, the author’s evaluation of the technologies and policies deployed at 
these borders is similar to what the U.S. considers smart borders. For example, Argentina 
is currently using a smart border system (i.e., smart technologies without cross-border 
coordination) to protect its Bolivia-Paraguay borders from narcotrafficking, through the 
use of sensors, detection apparatuses, and delivery vehicles.10 These technologies could 
assist other additional Latin American countries with stopping national threats by 
determining where a crossing exists, and prompting security organizations to dispatch 
border agents to intercept threats. 
Implementation of smart borders in Latin America has begun recently, and the 
impacts are on a global level, rather than simply hemispheric. To adopt smart borders 
throughout Latin America, nation-states need to understand where they currently exist, 
what they look like, where there is a need for them, and how they could be further 
implemented. With Argentina being the first country to use a unilateral smart border system 
 
8 United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, “Border Management,” accessed 
January 24, 2020, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/border-control/. 
9 United Nations, International Narcotics Control Board Report 2017, Report No. E/INCB/2017/1 
(Vienna, Austria: United Nations office, January 2018): 78, https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/
AnnualReports/AR2017/Annual_Report/E_2017_AR_ebook.pdf; Ivan Briscoe, “Trouble on the borders: 
Latin America’s new conflict zones,” Madrid: FRIDE, (July 2008): 1–2, https://www.researchgate.net/
profile/Ivan_Briscoe2/publication/265029389_Trouble_on_the_borders_Latin_America’s_new_conflict_zo
nes/links/56b45f0308ae636a540da06b.pdf; Gabriel Marcella,  “The Transformation of Security in Latin 
America: a Cause for Common Action,” Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 2 (March 2013): 70, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24388286?seq=1. 
10 Eduardo Szklarz, “Argentina Launches First Smart Border Surveillance System in Latin America,” 
Diálogo Digital Military Magazine, December 10, 2019, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/argentina-
launches-first-smart-border-surveillance-system-in-latin-america/. 
4 
in South America, 10 others are using or plan to use equipment and policies found on smart 
borders.11  
This thesis hypothesizes that existing smart borders do not contribute to stability in 
the Western Hemisphere, but can assist in the surveillance of sovereign territory 
boundaries. As more nation-states begin to implement smart borders for both monitoring 
border regions and streamlining processing and management of controlled border control 
points, this research can contribute to this field of study by determining what unilateral and 
binational programs complement these technologies which contribute to border awareness 
at international boundaries.  
Although this thesis set out to determine if border technologies alter the geopolitics 
of the borderlands and contribute to stability or instability in the Western Hemisphere, there 
is no evidence that technology influences stability or instability in the border-regions of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay, the United States and Mexico, and the United 
States and Canada. The youth of the border security technologies at Argentina’s northern 
and northwestern borders leaves unanswered questions about the effectiveness of 
Argentinian border deployments, which will only be answered after more time has elapsed. 
The U.S.-Mexico borderland is saturated with both border security technologies and border 
security policies, which demonstrates failure in migration and humanitarian assistance, but 
success in trade and commerce. Lastly, the U.S.-Canada case exhibits regional stability at 
a border focused on programs facilitating security and trade, however the area’s strength 
seems to correspond with each nation-states similar living and economic conditions. 
 
11 John Otis, “Brazil leads the way on global commercial drone boom,” PRI, January 6, 2013, 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-01-06/brazil-leads-way-global-commercial-drone-boom; Jason Koebler, 
“American Defense Companies Try to Break Israel’s Grasp on Latin American Drone Market,” U.S. News, 
July 15, 2013, https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/07/15/american-defense-companies-try-to-
break-israels-grasp-on-latin-american-drone-market; W. Alejandro Sánchez, “COHA Report: Drones in 
Latin America” (official memorandum, Washington, DC: Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2014), 
http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
COHA_Sanchez_LATAM_Drones_Final_Jan122014.pdf. 
5 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Security Technologies at Smart Borders in the Western Hemisphere 
Other than the use of physical walls, border deployments can take the shape of 
surveillance technologies. Two categories used for these border security technologies are 
vehicles and sensors. Vehicles consist of aerostats, towers, and drones.12 Sensors include 
radar, imagery, cameras, doppler, illuminators, seismic indicators, electromagnetic and 
gravity detectors, rangefinders, and thermal imaging.13 
Also, countries using border security technologies are separated into three 
categories: integrated surveillance, multi-layered sensors and single sensors. Integrated 
surveillance systems found in Argentina use a control center for monitoring.14 Multi-
layered sensors utilized in Mexico, such as radar and drones, do not contain a central 
control point.15 Lastly, single sensor equipment is used in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.16 These systems are monitored individually to 
provide information on illegal crossings into each nation’s sovereign territories. 
The term “smart border” comes from the Smart Border Declaration between the 
U.S. and Canada in 2001, which allowed for enhanced border security practices between 
both nations.17 This announcement has become the backbone of border securities 
 
12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Border 
Surveillance Systems (BSS), Report No. DHS/CBP/PIA-022(a) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp022-bss-september2018.pdf.  
13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Border 
Surveillance Systems (BSS).  
14 Szklarz, “Argentina Launches First Smart Border Surveillance System in Latin America;” Bonnie 
Berkowitz, Shelly Tan and Kevin Uhrmacher, “Beyond the Wall: Dogs, Blimps and Other Things Used to 
Secure the Border,” The Washington Post, February 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
2019/national/what-is-border-security/. 
15 Adam Isacson, Maureen Meyer, and Gabriela Morales, “Mexico’s Other Border: Security, 
Migration, and the Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America,” WOLA: Advocacy for Human 
Rights in the Americas, June 2014, https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/
WOLA_The%20Other%20Border%20Publication.pdf. 
16 Otis, “Brazil leads the way on global commercial drone boom;” Sánchez, “COHA Report: Drones 
in Latin America.” 
17 White House, U.S. - Canada Smart Border/30 Point Action Plan Update, (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021206-1.html. 
6 
throughout the western hemisphere. A modern example of smart borders, or border security 
surveillance technologies, is witnessed at the U.S.-Mexico border. U.S. government 
entities, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), manage a robust surveillance system to detect border crossings at the 
southern border.18 This Border Surveillance System (BSS) incorporates mobile and fixed 
technologies, and has the ability to gather evidence for law enforcement investigations. In 
2019, CBP seized more migrants than any year in the last decade.19 Tucson Sector Division 
Chief, Raligh Leonard, has acknowledged that surveillance technologies have created an 
accurate and productive detection process than in the past.20 These surveillance 
technologies are not only used in North America, but are beginning to emerge within Latin 
America. 
Although some Latin American nations have components of a border surveillance 
system, the only system similar to the U.S. is that of Argentina. Argentina launched the 
first smart border system in Latin America on October 1, 2019, consisting of sensors, 
radars, vehicles, and ships.21 The integration of this Isreali system will provide surveillance 
and detection of criminal groups at the borders of Bolivia and Paraguay, who are 
responsible for 85 percent of incoming drugs.22 If the system proves successful, the spread 
of these integrated systems could be seen throughout Latin America. Hints of this can be 
witnessed through the use of UAV employment in Chile.23 The demand for surveillance 
 
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Border 
Surveillance Systems (BSS). 
19 John Gramlich and Luis Noe-Bustamante, “What’s Happening at the U.S.-Mexico Border in 5 
Charts,” Pew Research Center, November 1, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/01/
whats-happening-at-the-u-s-mexico-border-in-5-charts/.  
20 Eric Blum, “Further Reflection- Surveillance technology boosts border security in Arizona,” U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, accessed February 18, 2020, https://www.cbp.gov/frontline/frontline-june-
az-technology. 
21 Szklarz, “Argentina Launches First Smart Border Surveillance System in Latin America.” 
22 Szklarz. 
23  John A. Cope, and Andrew Parks, “Strategic Perspectives- Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil,” 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, May 15, 2014, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1014327.pdf; 
Sánchez, “COHA Report: Drones in Latin America.” 
7 
technologies is foreseen to rise, to create improved border security systems and 
strengthened territorial border regions. 
2. Literature on Stability and Instability in the Western Hemisphere
According to a recent literature review, one definition of stability is “particularly
applied to the area of International Relations, stability is a property with a dynamic 
equilibrium and localized robustness, applied to a state of affairs.”24 Focusing on historic 
and present instabilities can assist in determining what stability looks like in Latin America. 
Systemic violence in the region, particularly in Central America, plays a major role in 
deterring stability.25 This violence, caused by failed governments unable to combat 
domestic threats, does not only affect these states, but resonates throughout the region. 
Additionally, ‘border-penetrating’ due to porosity has allowed for a mixture of illicit and 
licit traffic amongst neighboring states.26 While interconnected neighboring states benefit 
from unrestricted flows of commerce and communications, national threats are taking 
advantage of these flows by blending into the licit flow of passage. Finally, while 
recognizing major factors which contribute to volatility, a determination can be made to 
focus on these issues that may lead to a more stable Western Hemisphere. 
Instability in the northern triangle is feeding the fire at the Mexico-Guatemala 
border region. As citizens are driven out of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala due to 
high crime and homicide rates and poor living situations, the U.S. immigration percentages 
from these countries have risen an average of 25% in an eight-year period, compared to 
Mexico’s -6%.27 These numbers can oversaturate nations like Mexico, who may struggle 
24 Claudio D. Antonini, “Definition of Stability in International Relations,” IFAC Proceedings 
Volumes 32, no. 2 (July 1999): 6345, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1474-6670(17)57083-4. 
25 Adrian Barbu, “War on Drugs in Latin America- A Failed War? Colombia - The Learned Lesson,” 
Revista de Administratie Publica Si Politici Sociale 12, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 115, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1641106095/. 
26 David R. Mares, Latin America and the Illusion of Peace, 1st ed. (Boca Raton, FL: Routledge, 
Taylor and Francis, 2018) 43, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351224420. 
27 D’vera Cohn, Jeffrey S. Passel and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “Rise in U.S. Immigrants From El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras Outpaces Growth from Elsewhere,” Pew Research Center, December 
7, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2017/12/07/rise-in-u-s-immigrants-from-el-salvador-
guatemala-and-honduras-outpaces-growth-from-elsewhere/. 
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to provide enough resources for basic human rights. Furthermore, identifying the root cause 
of the Central American problem could assist in determining why this northern migration 
is occurring. The systemic reason for the poor living conditions points back to U.S. 
Criminal deportees who came from California in the 1990s, bringing a territorial gang 
mentality to Central America.28 This vicious circle created thirty years ago has created a 
less-stable North America. A step towards future stability begins at a core component of 
governmental policy making. 
Consequently, a stable Latin America begins with policies that recognize the long-
term implications of a document based on border security. As governments impose 
policies, especially those of a bilateral and multilateral nature, all parties should consider 
alternatives that could deter loopholes, inequality, and neglect of those vested in the 
agreement. For example, a foreign policy implemented by Ecuador following the collapse 
of the Venezuelan government allowed for migrants, with the required biometrics, to cross 
their borders to transit into the next adjacent country.29 This policy exemplifies multiple 
nations understanding the implications of migrants travelling through foreign territories, 
rather than around national borders, in search of a stable livelihood. Furthermore, U.S. 
intervention in Latin America’s security is evident in a 1990s policy that has been on hiatus, 
but may reorganize. A U.S. driven policy named “3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area (TBA) 
Security,” comprised of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, focused on strengthening security 
from threats in the region, specifically terrorism and transnational crime.30 The reinitiation 
of this policy-making group could not come at a better time, due to Argentina’s push for 
border security technology with Bolivia and Paraguay.31 As Latin America continues to 
 
28 David James Cantor, “As Deadly as Armed Conflict? Gang Violence and Forced Displacement in 
the Northern Triangle of Central America,” Agenda Internacional 23, no. 34 (September 1, 2016): 84, 
https://doi.org/10.18800/agenda.201601.003. 
29 Bruno Dupeyron, “Perspectives on Mercosur Borders and Border Spaces: Implications for Border 
Theories.” Journal of Borderlands Studies 24, no. 3 (January 17, 2020): 12, https://doi.org/10.1080/
08865655.2009.9695739. 
30 Sarah Neilson, “Fighting Terror in the Tri-Border Area,” The Wilson Center, December 9, 2019, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/fighting-terror-the-tri-border-area. 
31 Eduardo Szklarz, “Argentina Launches First Smart Border Surveillance System in Latin America.” 
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address crime and immigration problems, U.S. cooperation can provide the tools necessary 
to address these issues. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses an exploratory design to qualitatively evaluate evolving 
environments, and is accomplished through three objectives: (1) identifying each border 
region’s idiosyncrasies, such as border cities, geography, politics, cultures, border traffic 
management, geopolitics, and understanding the genesis of these border spaces; (2) 
explaining how and what kinds of exchanges occur within these environments; and (3) 
examining the types of threats and technological responses the nation-states have 
implemented. To assist in performing step one, the method utilized is a geopolitical 
analysis using digital technologies to study the interplay between population conflict and 
territory. 
This thesis examines three specific cases which represent the most advanced use of 
border management, technological innovation, and border deployments in the America’s: 
the smart border between the United States and Mexico; the smart border between the 
United States and Canada; and the unilateral smart border connecting Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, and Paraguay. The reasoning behind the selection of the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-
Canada borders is due to them being the only true smart borders in the Western 
Hemisphere. While Argentina’s borders with Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay do not fulfill 
the elements of smart borders, the region is a unilateral smart border and is the South 
American border most similar to traditional smart borders. Additionally, these regions 
represent similarities to other borders throughout the hemisphere due to a wide range of 
variables they represent at each border, including traffic capacities and management, 
economic differences, varying population, concentration of forces at border territories, and 
levels of employed border security surveillance technologies. Canada was primarily 
selected due to its long-standing peace with the United States, and because of economic 
and political similarities Canada shares with its southern neighbor. These border regions 
exhibit distinct individualities that separate themselves from each other. The differences 
found in these borderlands and border-cities often show cultural and economic ties that are 
10 
not found in regions outside of border areas. Analysis identifies these regions’ cultural 
identities, politics, geography, border management, the origin behind the border, and 
geopolitics, and creates an understanding as to why these border regions exist and what 
dynamics have sparked the insertion of smart border and surveillance technologies.32 
Subsequently, these regional factors become the framework allowing for deeper 
understanding into the bilateral and multilateral arrangements at these international 
borders. 
Furthermore, to examine the effects of border security technologies on stability the 
analysis begins with an understanding of the border threats in the region. These threats 
range from micro level issues at the regional front such as smuggling contraband, to macro 
problems which can jeopardize a nation’s homeland security, such as terrorists determined 
to create cells within a host nation. The first line of defense in combating the different 
threat levels is a national entry control point. Understanding the capabilities and limitations 
of each entry point assists in determining if a control point’s attributes are capable of 
identifying and prosecuting those with illegal or hostile intent. Border security technologies 
are used at these international ports of entry to help streamline the entrance process, but 
these technologies are also being used to decrease illegal border crossings in remote 
borderland regions.  
A framework can be established to determine what a system of surveillance 
equipment looks like. Furthermore, analyzing other countries within Central and South 
America with border technologies that are not encompassed within a system can explain 
which nation-states might implement the next smart border systems. Amongst the countries 
using smart border surveillance equipment, it is important to understand how these 
technologies are being used to meet a specific national objective. 
The types of data relied on for this research encompassed the number of crossing 
points per border, the number of crossings (vehicular, rail, and pedestrian) per annum, 
traffic management and ballooning mitigation at each port of entry, potential vulnerabilities 
 
32 James Gerber, “Governed and Ungoverned Integration in the Mexico–US Border Region,” Regions 
and Cohesion 10, no. 2 (June 2020): 29, https://doi.org/10.3167/reco.2020.100203. 
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at border control points, type and extent of smart border technologies in use at each crossing 
point, and the effectiveness of these technologies against border threats. Qualitative 
methodology was used to interpret and analyze data due to the unquantifiable nature of the 
thesis question. The data was then cross-examined with border threats and stability (or 
instability) in the region to identify relationships with border security surveillance 
technology. Analyzing the subsequent data eventually created a narrative of each 
borderland, which uncovered the benefits and disadvantages of smart border technology 
use for achieving a national political objective. 
1. Limitations 
This geopolitical analysis of the smart borders between the United States and 
Mexico; the smart border between the United States and Canada; and the smart border 
connecting Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay only provides a micro lens of Western 
Hemisphere borders. While it focuses on the only known smart borders in the hemisphere, 
10 other nation-states will soon meet these criteria creating opportunities for follow-on 
macro research. Furthermore, as technology continues to advance, more capable and 
intrusive border surveillance technologies will continue to become implemented within 
these smart borders and will eventually result in the need for future analysis and possible 
linkages between new technologies and stability or instability.  
12 
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II. ARGENTINE CASE STUDY 
To understand the Argentina-Bolivia-Brazil-Paraguay border region and why the 
Argentine National Gendarmerie is utilizing border security surveillance technology at 
these unions, the following literature addresses the origin behind the deployment (there is 
no evidence that Argentina’s smart border is being used at the Chile and Uruguay 
borderlands, so these geopolitical boundaries will not be discussed). The geography of this 
area plays a significant role in determining the number of border-cities in the region. As 
traffic from adjacent nation-states push into Argentina, eight main borderland cities act as 
ports of entry for legitimate crossings. In addition to legal crossings, drug traffickers 
continue to find methods of breaching these entry points, leading Argentina to install 
border security surveillance technology. Benefits of a smart border assist the Argentine 
National Gendarmerie in the prevention of illegal border crossings. Although the region’s 
smart border at the northern border and the TBA (Figure 1) is newly implemented, the 
advance in surveillance technology is a force multiplier for Argentina to combat trafficking 
and terrorism. 
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Map of Northern Argentina with Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay borders, or Tri-Border 
Region, and the analyzed border control points. 
Figure 1. Northern Argentina Border Region.33 
A. BOLIVIA BORDER 
The Origin of the Argentina-Bolivia border stems from multiple exchanges of land, 
followed by two wars that shaped the border region. The 17th century’s Incan control of the 
Argentina-Bolivia border was interrupted by colonization by the Spanish Crown. By the 
early 19th century the Argentinian territory, known then as the United Provinces of Rio De 
La Plata, became independent from Spain, and became the state of Bolivia in 1827.34 
Argentina finally gained statehood in the mid 19th century, although the Bolivian border 
had not yet solidified. Two final wars helped shape the border region, leaving a 480-mile 
political boundary separating the two countries. First, the War of the Pacific, won by Chile 
 
33 Source: Northern Argentina map, Google Maps, accessed April 18, 2020, https://www.google.com/
maps/@-26.3976313,-60.5015338,5.82z. 
34 “The History of South America: Every Year,” February 16, 2017, EmperorTigerstar, video, 1:26, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UULp33MNNNE. 
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against Bolivia and Peru, formed the western extent of the border.35 Second, the Chaco 
War, won by Paraguay, completed the border region on the eastern border.36 Since the 
signing of the Chaco War treaty in 1935, the border has remained identical. 
Geography and geopolitical features at the borderlands have contributed to several 
settlements for both Argentina and Bolivia. There are only three neighboring cities 
constrained by geography at the 480-mile Argentina-Bolivia border, namely Villazon-La 
Quiaca, Bermejo-Aguas Blancas, and Yacuíba-Salvador Mazza.37 These geopolitical cities 
are the outlets to each nation in the border territory. Crossing at any point nearby or 
adjacent to these three entry-points is deemed illegal by both nations. Villazon-La Quiaca, 
the westernmost entry-point of Argentina and Bolivia, lies in the highlands adjacent to the 
Andes Mountains. The last two border towns, Bermejo-Aguas Blancas and Yacuíba-
Salvador Mazza, are located in eastern subtropical regions of Argentina-Bolivia, avoiding 
the harsh equatorial climate near the Argentina-Bolivia-Paraguay junction. Argentinian 
border agents provide screening in an environment incorporating identities from either side 
of the border. 
1. Cultural and Social Aspects 
Although Argentina and Bolivia are neighboring nation-states, differences in 
national and cultural identity affect almost half of Bolivian migrants living in Argentina.38 
Some variances include historic culture and the education system. Ethnic group differences 
are seen by glancing at the cultures within the populace. Argentina’s ethnic group 
 
35 V. Kiernan, “Foreign Interests in the War of the Pacific,” Hispanic American Historical Review 35, 
no. 1 (February 1, 1955): 14–36. https://doi.org/10.2307/2509249. 
36 Bruce W. Farcau, The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932–1935, Westport, Conn: Praeger, 
1996, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow101. 
37 José Edgardo Dipierri, Emma Laura Alfaro Gomez, Alvaro Rodríguez-Larralde, and Virginia 
Ramallo, “Isonymic Relations in the Bolivia-Argentina Border Region,” Human Biology 88, no. 3 
(Summer, 2016): 192. 
38 “South-South Remittance Flows from Argentina to Bolivia: An Unexplored Remittance Corridor,” 
States News Service, May 9, 2014, https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-ndeg49-south-south-remittance-
corridor-between-argentina-and-bolivia. 
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percentages are 97 European and mestizo, 2.5 Amerindian, and 0.5 African.39 Bolivian 
ethnic groups, by percentage, are 68 mestizo, 20 indigenous, 5 Caucasian, with the 
remaining 7 are either African, indigenous cholo/chola, or unspecified.40 Although the 
majority of both countries are of European descent, Bolivia’s indigenous heritage is much 
stronger than that within its southern neighbor. Argentina and Bolivia’s demographics also 
demonstrate a wide margin of variances, including immigration, wage imbalance and 
education. Due to Argentina’s economic success (GDP ranked second in South America 
behind Brazil) immigrants have made up five percent of the population since 2015, with 8 
in 10 having arrived from neighboring countries.41 Additionally, Bolivia’s demographics 
include the highest income inequality in Latin America, and institutional struggles with 
public education, including low elementary school completion rates in rural areas.42 It is 
clear why Bolivians migrate to Argentina. The chances for stability and wealth are far 
greater for Bolivians who travel to Argentina than for those who remain in their home 
country. 
Indigenous groups, who have historically crossed these borderlands in search of 
economic stability, constitute a separate type of border traffic from Bolivia to Argentina. 
Studies show that seasonal migration from Bolivia’s Andean region to Argentina has 
occurred for generations. These migrating peoples of Bolivia work as laborers in Argentina 
and view migrations as life experiences accompanied by discrimination from 
Argentinians.43 These seasonal migrations affect the western portion of the Argentina-
Bolivia border, which is rarely monitored by the Argentine National Gendarmerie due to 
harsh terrain and inclement weather. Additionally, Guaraní people, also viewed as floating 
populations, see the central and eastern Argentina-Bolivia border as passable regardless of 
 
39 “South America: Argentina,” Central Intelligence Agency, March 3, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html. 
40 “South America: Bolivia,” Central Intelligence Agency, February 28, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html. 
41 Central Intelligence Agency, “South America: Argentina.” 
42 Central Intelligence Agency, “South America: Bolivia.” 
43 David Preston, “Identity and Migration: Tarijeños and the Argentina experience,” Globalization 
and Mobility of Capital and Labour in Rural Latin America (2002): 35–40, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.9.200&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=35. 
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political boundary. Those living in Bolivia call Argentina “the place where there is 
work.”44 Chesterton elaborates with Guaraní in Argentina calling Bolivia ‘the place of 
family.’ This identity contains strong cultural ties that disregard political boundaries, 
leading to a civil quandary for the Argentine National Gendarmerie who are sworn to 
protect their homeland by screening all traffic coming from Bolivia. 
2. Entry Points 
The western-most control-point at the intersection of Villazon and La Quiaca 
contains the most diverse method of separating border traffic, while allowing for a 
relatively easy method of illegal crossing. Figure 2 illustrates the traffic separation scheme 
at the Villazon-La Quiaca border, which is capable of handling/processing/monitoring 
heavy throughput when necessary. The border crossing separates traffic into three 
categories; public transportation, personal vehicles, and foot traffic. These traffic divides 
mitigate ballooning at specific entry points through adjustments in lane access. However, 
a vulnerability at the Villazon-La Quiaca border crossing is the Río De La Quiaca River. 
Bolivians and Argentinians are able to cross the dry riverbed with ease, demonstrating the 
permeability at the Villazon-La Quiaca borderlands.45 While rainy seasons may lessen the 
number of illegal crossings due to higher water levels, those willing to chance a dangerous 
crossing will always persist. 
 
44 Bridget Maria Chesterton, The Chaco War: Environment, Ethnicity, and Nationalism, (New York: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 125–6, 10.5040/9781474248907. 
45 “Argentina: Cross-Border Trafficking,” December 22, 2016, Aljazeera, Video, 4:27, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/latin-america-investigates/2016/12/argentina-cross-border-
trafficking-161220093349365.html. 
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The westernmost Argentina-Bolivia border crossing contains a single-entry point at the 
intersection of Highway 9 and 14, and crosses the Río De La Quiaca River. 
Figure 2. Villazon-La Quiaca Border Map.46 
Figures 3 and 4 display different mediums used to access the adjacent country at 
the Bermejo-Aguas Blancas and Yacuíba -Salvador Mazza borders, while incorporating a 
specific cultural identity that directly affects these borderlands. The border cities of 
 
46 Source: Villazon-La Quiaca border map, Google Maps, accessed May 17, 2020, 
https://www.google.com/maps/@-22.0985493,-65.6103908,13.97z/data=!5m1!1e4. 
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Bermejo-Aguas Blancas and Yacuiba-Salvador Mazza separate vehicles and people 
crossing the border. At the Bermejo-Aguas Blancas border, pedestrians choose between a 
two-lane bridge or a boat to cross the Río Bermejo river, while the Yacuíba-Salvador 
Mazza crossing is divided by railroad and a two-lane road for vehicles. Both entry points 
provide alternate ways of entering and exiting the country if one crossing method is 
oversaturated, although both are limited to only two open access points by government 
enforcement. Furthermore, a cultural identity, seen at both Bermejo-Aguas Blancas and 
Yacuíba-Salvador Mazza border regions, is the Guaraní People. The Bermejo, Bolivia 
border region is home to a Guaraní village with over 200 indigenous, while the neighboring 
city of Aguas Blancas, Argentina houses two Guaraní villages with approximately 400 
residents.47 On a larger scale, the city of Yacuíba, Bolivia is the home to over 500 
Guaraní’s, while Salvador Mazza, Argentina contains villages housing over 3,000 Guaraní 
people.48 The Guaraní people do not see the border as an impenetrable boundary, but rather 
a political boundary separating family in Bolivia from household income in Argentina.49 
Indigenous peoples are not the only groups willing to cross the borderlands into Argentina. 
Others seeking quick monetary rewards through smuggling often cross with illegal intents. 
 
47 Levi M. Pereira, Rosa Colman and Flávio V. Machado, “2016 Guarani Continental Map Project 
Technical File,” Guarani Digital Weather, accessed on February 18, 2020, https://guarani.map.as/#!/. 
48 Pereira, Colman and Machado, “2016 Guarani Continental Map Project Technical File.” 
49 Chesterton, The Chaco War: Environment, Ethnicity, and Nationalism. 
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The entry control point includes two methods of crossing, specifically the Aguas Blancas 
International Bridge and a ferry that crosses the Río Bermejo River. 
Figure 3. Bermejo-Aguas Blancas Border Map.50 
 
50 Source: Bermejo-Aguas Blancas border map, Google Maps, accessed May 17, 2020, 
https://www.google.com/maps/@-22.7363385,-64.3600025,13.84z/data=!5m1!1e4. 
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The single-entry control point is the third-and-final port of entry at the Argentina-Bolivia 
border, and the easternmost border crossing in the province of Salta, Argentina. 
Figure 4. Yacuíba-Salvador Mazza Border Map.51 
A dilemma at Argentina’s northern border is traffickers coming from Bolivia and 
moving towards urbanized areas near Buenos Aires. Drug trafficking is a ‘blip’ on 
Argentina’s radar that continually “pesters” the regime in Buenos Aires. Argentine 
Secretary of Security Eugenio Burzaco recently stated that 85 percent of drugs, primarily 
 
51 Source: Yacuíba-Salvador Mazza border map, Google Maps, accessed May 17, 2020, 
https://www.google.com/maps/@-22.0459499,-63.7332638,12.47z/data=!5m1!1e4. 
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marijuana and cocaine, cross illegally through the northern border.52 The Secretary is not 
alluding to a recent problem with Bolivia, but one of historical precedence. These drug 
smuggling problems at the northern Argentina border date back to the mid-twentieth 
century. Bolivia’s smuggling corridors supplied cocaine to drug-using communities in 
Argentina beginning in 1950.53 By the late 1990s, one-third of the world’s coca production 
came from the Bolivian regions.54 The numbers of Bolivian production have dwindled 
since the rise of Colombia’s coca market, but the coca-growing regions east of La Paz are 
still producing the same cocaine that was sought after in the 20th century. 
B. THE TRIPLE FRONTIER 
Three major events in the 19th and 20th centuries, the first of which was the 
Ragamuffin War, shaped the Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay borderlands shown in  
Figure 5, known as South America’s TBA.55 The result of conflict between the former 
state of Rio Grande do Sul and Brazil was the 1840 addition of Brazilian lands extending 
along eastern Argentina and ending at Uruguay.56 The second event to shape the Southern 
Cone was the War of the Triple Alliance, or Paraguayan War. The outcome was a 40 
percent loss of Paraguay’s land in 1870, giving Argentina its north-east ‘finger shape’ that 
jets past Paraguay and Brazil, ending at the Triple Frontier.57 Paraguay’s final geographic 
structure occurred at the conclusion of the Chaco War in 1935, resulting in the forfeiture 
 
52 Szklarz, “Argentina Launches First Smart Border Surveillance System in Latin America.” 
53 Paul Gootenberg, “The ‘Pre-Colombian’ Era of Drug Trafficking in the Americas: Cocaine, 1945–
1965,” The Americas 64, no. 2 (October 1, 2007): Section- Argentina: Cocaine Mafias, https://doi.org/
10.1353/tam.2007.0148. 
54 Madeline Barbara Léons, and Harry Sanabria, “Coca and cocaine in Bolivia: Reality and policy 
illusion,” Coca, Cocaine, and the Bolivian Reality (1997): 2–3. 
55 Fernando Rabossi, “Bridging Three Nations: The triple Border Between Paraguay, Argentina, and 
Brazil is Both a Cultural Melting Pot and a Regional Hotspot for Illicit Trade. What Does its History 
Reveal?” NACLA Report on the Americas 51, no. 1 (March 2019): 66, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/10714839.2019.1593693?casa_token=xZgxOr0PdPIAAAAA:GmTYEupXodHryfv-
ZlOFma6DpdNlkyx7CpeXlDOodk5NXIhMeHq9JMxEXrpHEpqzVNevjNNiuBUom0E.  
56 Catherine Davies, Brewster, Claire, and Owen, Hilary. South American Independence: Gender, 
Politics, Text (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006), 210–4, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vjgjr. 
57 Leslie Bethell, “The Paraguayan War (1864-1870),” ISA Research Papers 46 (1996): 1–9, 
https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3585/1/B28_-_The_Paraguayan_War_(1864-1870).pdf. 
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of Bolivia’s Gran Chaco to Paraguay.58 In sum, Argentina’s 2,356mile political border 
with Brazil and Paraguay created South America’s Triple Frontier.59 
 
The region, also known as the Triple Frontier, is a U.S. top priority due to its links to 
terrorism threats in Latin America. 
Figure 5. Tri-Border Region of South America.60 
Considerable distance separates the geopolitical features in the Triple Frontier. 
With over two-thousand miles of border, large cities in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
only meet twice in the form of adjacent border cities, specifically: Encarnacion, Paraguay, 
and Posadas, Argentina, and Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, and Puerto 
Iguazu, Argentina. The reason behind the small number of border cities lies in the region’s 
 
58 Farcau, The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932–1935. 
59 Central Intelligence Agency, “South America: Argentina.” 
60 Source: Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, CRS Report No. 
RS21049 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 22, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/
RS21049.pdf; Rabossi, “Bridging Three Nations: The triple Border Between Paraguay, Argentina, and 
Brazil is Both a Cultural Melting Pot and a Regional Hotspot for Illicit Trade. What Does its History 
Reveal?”; Ana R. Sverdlick, “Terrorists and Organized Crime Entrepreneurs in the ‘Triple Frontier’ 
Among Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay,” Trends in Organized Crime 9, no. 2 (December 2005): 86–7, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-005-1028-6. 
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demographics. Paraguay’s major border cities are solely in the east due to impacts of 
climate and survivability. Imagine the Paraguay River, which splits the nation from north 
to south, as Paraguay’s marker for climate change. The western Chaco region is desolate 
and unsustainable, and the eastern Paraneña contains a fertile moderate climate including 
two rivers at the Argentina border: the Paraguay and Paraná.61 The latter is inhabited by 
almost 98 percent of the Paraguayan population.62 This illustrates why three large border 
cities, relative to Paraguay’s population, namely Asunión, Encarnacion, and Ciudad del 
Este, are located near the TBA in the east. 
 
Figure 6. 2015 Population Density Map of the Southern Cone.63 
 
61 “Parana River Basin,” EU Watch: Water and Global Change, accessed on April 21, 2020, 
http://www.waterandclimatechange.eu/river-basin/parana. 
62 “Country Profile: Paraguay,” Library of Congress: Federal Research Division, October 2005, 6–7, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Paraguay-new.pdf. 
63 Source: “South America’s Population: Clinging to the Coasts,” Geopolitical Futures, July 28, 2017, 
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/south-americas-population-clinging-coasts/; Original image was cropped to 
focus on the Southern Cone region and the compass was superimposed to the bottom-right from the section 
removed.  
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There are certain parallels between Argentine and Paraguayan borderland 
populations in relation to extreme climates, resulting in urban areas located in tropical 
regions without dry seasons, illustrating the reasoning for geopolitical settlements in the 
western Tri-Border corridor. Argentina’s northern populations along the Paraguayan 
border demonstrate similar characteristics to their neighbor in regards to climate. 
Argentina’s northern provinces of Formosa, Chaco, Corrientes, and Missiones can be 
separated into two climates: tropical with a dry season and tropical without a dry season.64 
While the majority of the Formosa and Chaco provinces are categorized as tropical with a 
dry season, Corrientes and Missiones provinces have an absence of dry weather. When 
identifying urban areas and population density, the densest populations are found in the 
regions without an extensive dry season, as seen in Figure 6. For instance, eastern regions 
of the Formosa and Chaco provinces, with the relatively moderate climate, are home to 
both provinces’ capital cities: Formosa and Resistencia.65 Similarly, Paraguay’s two 
largest cities by population equaling nearly 800 thousand residents, which include the 
capital city Asunción and Ciudad del Este, lie in the humid southern regions of the Chaco 
and Alto Paraná, seen in Figure 7. The northern “Dry Chaco” is sparsely populated due to 
harsh environmental conditions, including minimal rainfall. These moderate climate 
locations contribute to the makeup of the outermost TBA in South America. 
 
64 Norberto R. Coppari et al., “Argentine Republic,” IAEA: Country Nuclear Power Profiles, 2012, 
1.1.2 Geography and Climate, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/CNPP2012_CD/
countryprofiles/Argentina/Argentina.htm. 
65 “Administrative Map of Argentina,” One World- Nations Online, accessed on April 22, 2020, 
https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/argentina-administrative-map.htm. 
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Figure 7. The Five Ecoregions of Paraguay.66 
Brazil, the final nation-state of the Triple Frontier, occupies the TBA with another 
means of population distribution and is at the forefront of the national security quandary in 
the Western Hemisphere. Figure 6 illustrates that the majority of Brazil’s populations are 
coastal, with their southern states’ urbanized areas dispersed along the Atlantic coastline. 
Only three cities are within vicinity of Argentine borderlands: (north to south) Foz do 
Iguaçu, Dionísio Cerqueira, and São Borja. The largest of the three being Foz do Iguaçu, 
with over 250 thousand residents, lies at the intersection of the Iguazu and Paraná rivers. 
This river junction separates Brazil’s Foz do Iguaçu from Ciudad del Este, Paraguay and 
Puerto Iguazú, Argentina, and has become a recent South American national security “hot 
spot” for nation-states in the Western Hemisphere. Washington has placed the region at the 
 
66 Source: David Koch, “Landscape Epidemiology of Hantavirus in the Atlantic Forest of Paraguay,” 
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top of its list for terrorist threats in Latin America, and scholars have found evidence of 
terrorist factions blending with organized crime organizations for network support and 
economic sustenance.67 An expansion on border threats in the Triple Frontier region will 
continue later in the chapter, but was worth noting while identifying the largest Brazilian 
city on the Argentina border which contributes to one-third of the region’s successes and 
failures. 
1. Cultural and Social Aspects 
The Triple Frontier embraces a rich cultural heritage that rallies around a symbol 
of peace between Paraguay and Brazil, and each of the three border-cities, namely Ciudad 
del Este, Foz do Iguaçu, and Puerto Iguazú, demonstrate social similarities with regards to 
immigrants. A cultural link between the cities of Ciudad del Este, Paraguay and Foz do 
Iguaçu, Brazil is the “Friendship Bridge” which spans across the Paraná River. Completed 
in March 1965, the “Friendship Bridge” supports between 40 to 60 thousand people 
crossing per day.68 The irony of the “Friendship Bridge” has been witnessed through recent 
diplomatic maneuvers and illicit transportation of goods amongst the two neighbors. A 
recent cleavage formed between both nation-states when Brazilian trade deficits, destined 
to ruin Ciudad del Este’s economic stability, were carried out against Paraguay in the mid-
2000s.69 Brazil diplomatically responded to the economic dilemma with Asunción, but 
Lambert described Brazil’s growing concern of illicit Paraguayan trafficking across the 
Brazil-Paraguay borderlands. Much like today, a portion of the contraband could be 
disguised as licit trade within cross-border traffic and could cross into Brazil undetected. 
The TBA is also known for its cultural diversity representing over 65 nationalities, 
including a large Muslim population. While over half of Arabs in the region live in Foz do 
Iguaçu, the other Muslims reside in the nearby city of Ciudad del Este, totaling between 20 
 
67 Rabossi, “Bridging Three Nations: The triple Border Between Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil is 
Both a Cultural Melting Pot and a Regional Hotspot for Illicit Trade. What Does its History Reveal?”; 
Sverdlick, “Terrorists and Organized Crime Entrepreneurs in the ‘Triple Frontier’ Among Argentina, 
Brazil, and Paraguay,” 86-7. 
68 Sverdlick, 89. 
69 Peter Lambert, “The Myth of the Good Neighbour: Paraguay’s Uneasy Relationship with Brazil,” 
Bulletin of Latin American Research 35, no. 1 (November 2015): 39, https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12410. 
28 
and 30 thousand residents.70 Hudson describes the Arab community as secluded from other 
ethnicities with Muslim schools and establishments, which create the ideal environment 
for extremist cells that rely on economic funding and recruitment. Furthermore, although 
some Arabs own commercial companies in Ciudad del Este, a majority reside across the 
Brazilian border within Foz do Iguaçu or in adjacent communities.71 
2. Reasoning for Crossings and Associated Threats 
Since the late 20th century the Triple Frontier has been a region with many 
fluctuating border security dynamics, specifically the inception of a 1990s multi-national 
economic partnership and an increase of migrants from Brazil crossing into Argentina. A 
recent agreement for an open border has created economic opportunities for these nation-
states, but not all results have been positive for the region. The birth of Mercosur in 1991 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay was intended to eliminate tariffs, 
improve economics and support democracy through a multinational bloc.72 The 
partnership resulted in an expedited screening process at border crossings, ultimately 
creating a region vulnerable to criminal behavior and illegal movement across these nation-
state borders. For example, the multilateral bloc contributed to two 1990s bombings in 
Buenos Aires targeting minority groups, one being the 1994 bombing on a Jewish 
community, which became the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentine history.73 Another 
aspect of border security in Argentina occurred more recently during a decade-long 
migration primarily from Brazil. Within a 10 year span beginning in the early 2000s 
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Senegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have travelled from Brazil into Argentina, 
oftentimes finding local Senegalese networks offering labor, social networking, cultural 
identity, and family relations.74 Some of these African migrants successfully traversed 
these borderlands undocumented, demonstrating the continued porosity in Argentina’s 
TBA in recent years.75 These examples do not only describe specific reasonings for border 
crossings into Argentina, but pinpoint potential threats to the nation-state’s national 
security due to inefficient border integrity. 
3. Entry points of the TBA 
The Argentine National Gendarmerie’s controlled entry points, at the Paraguay and 
Brazil borders, include waterways that split the nation-states borderlands and create a 
natural boundary. The northernmost access point shown in Figure 8, which connects 
Paraguay to Argentina over the Pilcomayo River, uses the River La Paz Mission 
International Bridge as the only means of transportation into either nation. The two-lane 
bridge connects the towns of Misión La Paz, Argentina and Pozo Hondo, Paraguay is under 
24-hour surveillance by the Argentine National Gendarmerie.76 The one vulnerability at 
this entry point is the ability to cross the Pilcomayo River due to its distance from its 
adjacent shoreline, and its curvature which provides locations unviewable from the 
international bridge only one mile upstream or down. At its widest point, the waterway 
measures approximately 400 feet in width and could be navigated by raft or small boat 
without the border patrols knowledge if the area’s topography is used for seclusion. 
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The River La Paz Mission International Bridge ties the nation-states of Argentina and 
Paraguay, and lies 12 miles southeast of the Argentina-Bolivia-Paraguay junction. 
Figure 8. Misión La Paz-Pozo Hondo Border Map.77 
Continuing south-east, the next international entry point separates the border cities 
of Clorinda, Argentina and José Falcón, Paraguay. Asunción, Paraguay’s capital city, is 
only a 20-mile drive which emphasizes commercial traffic to this port of entry. Figure 9 
depicts customs checkpoints on both sides of the San Ignacio de Loyola International 
Bridge, both the Argentine National Gendarmerie and Paraguay’s Border Patrol work 
 
77 Source: Misión La Paz-Pozo Hondo border map, Google Maps, accessed July 11, 2020, 
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together to screen traffic flows before entering their countries. The separation schemes split 
commercial traffic from personal vehicles, which assists in mitigating ballooning and 
allows for expediting customs processing. One drawback witnessed at the checkpoint is the 
lack of a public transportation lane. Being in close proximity to Asunción, the need for 
additional traffic separation enables faster processing times and consequently less traffic 
wait times. 
 
The area is heavily transited by commercial vehicles due to its close proximity to 
Paraguay’s capital city of Asunción. 
Figure 9. Clorinda-José Falcón Border Map.78 
 
78 Source: Clorinda-José Falcón border map, Google Maps, accessed July 11, 2020, 
https://www.google.com/maps/@-25.2770889,-57.7289384,14.98z.  
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The Ituzaingó-Yacyretá Island border crossing, as seen in Figure 10, uses the 
Yacyretá Hydroelectric Dam as the extension between the cities of Ituzaingó, Argentina 
and Ayolas, Paraguay. With some tourism, cross-border commuting, and commercial 
vehicles, this border checkpoint is one with minimal traffic compared to others at the 
Argentina-Paraguay borderlands. With customs checkpoints using multiple inspection 
booths, traffic separation schemes are not offered. Unless the cities of Ituzaingó and Ayolas 
grow considerably from their combined 40-thousand inhabitants, the need for separating 
border traffic is not warranted. However, crossings from Ituzaingó and Ayolas may 
multiply according to the Paraguayan Foreign Ministry. With the recent inauguration of 
the border crossing, both Argentina and Paraguay are expecting an “economic, commercial 
and tourist boost” in the region.79 If both nation’s forecasts are correct, configuring the 
point-of-entry to deal with heavier traffic flows may need to occur once trend analysis 
shows an increase in crossings. 
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Located adjacent to the Yacyretá Hydroelectric Dam on the Paraná River, the recently 
inaugurated crossing is the newest border control point between Argentina and Paraguay. 
Figure 10. Ituzaingó-Yacyretá Island Border Map.80 
Figure 11 represents the last international crossing along the Argentina-Paraguay 
border before the intersection of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay conjoins the cities of 
Posadas and Encarnación. The San Roque González de Santa Cruz International Bridge, 
 
80 Source: Ituzaingó-Yacyretá Island border map, Google Maps, accessed July 11, 2020, 
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consists of a 2-lane road and a railway, and has spanned the Paraná River since 1990.81 
The Posadas, Argentina customs checkpoint inspects traffic to-and-from Paraguay, with a 
total of eight lanes (four in each direction) dedicated to vehicle screening and a lane for 
commercial vehicles. Long wait times during peak traffic times can be witnessed at this 
border crossing for those entering and exiting Argentina. The Encarnación, Paraguay 
border control point also separates private autos, mass transit, and commercial vehicles for 
both incoming and outgoing traffic. Moreover, the commuter rail that connects the two 
cities has contributed towards reducing bridge traffic since December 2014, and runs every 
30 minutes across the international bridge.82 Spreading the load of cross-border traffic has 
benefited both cities combined 463-thousand residents, but with a current growth rates over 
two percent and predicted to reach over 450 thousand by 2030 in Posadas alone, the border 
control point may need to plan on expansion of the railway and customs checkpoints to 
avoid future ballooning.83 
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With the growth rates of Encarnación and Posadas increasing and predicted to continue, 
The San Roque González de Santa Cruz International Bridge may be forced to manage 
larger amounts of border traffic. 
Figure 11. Posadas-Encarnación Border Map.84 
The northernmost access from Argentina to Brazil, as seen in Figure 12, lies 
between the border cities of Puerto Iguazú and Foz do Iguaçu. This border checkpoint not 
 
84 Source: Posadas-Encarnación border map, Google Maps, accessed July 14, 2020, 
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only processes border traffic, but has recently strengthened surveillance to stop drug 
smuggling. In the heart of the Tri-Border Region, the Tancredo Neves Bridge services 
approximately 1.4 million people per year and is open 24 hours a day, and seven days a 
week.85 The two-lane structure, extending over the Iguazú River, is capped by two border 
patrol checkpoints serviced by the Argentine customs and migration authorities and the 
Federal Police of Brazil. Both border crossing stations contain multiple processing stations, 
but separate traffic differently according to the controlling authority. For example, the Foz 
do Iguaçu customs checkpoint divides public tourist vans from private automobiles and 
commercial trucks, while the Puerto Iguazú station separates trucks and buses from 
motorcycles, cars, and vans. One similarity that benefits both access points is the ability to 
shift routes during peak traffic hours by reassigning lanes to meet the traffic needs. These 
steps to mitigate traffic are also used to minimize illicit smuggling from Paraguay, through 
Brazil, into Argentina. Stronger surveillance at the border station has occurred since the 
early 2000s, and drug smugglers from Paraguay have found alternate ways to bypass the 
bridge and enter Argentina through international ports of entry such as Posadas.86 
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Located at the epicenter of the Tri-Border Region, the Tancredo Neves Bridge administers 
over one million crossings per year. 
Figure 12. Puerto Iguazú-Foz do Iguaçu Border Map.87 
The final five Argentina-Brazil international border crossings are located in the 
countryside of the Argentina-Brazil borderlands and fall outside of the scope of this 
research due to their distant proximity to the areas monitored by border surveillance 
 
87 Source: Puerto Iguazú-Foz do Iguaçu border map, Google Maps, accessed July 16, 2020, 
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technologies. These crossings are worth mentioning to complete the list of all Argentina-
Brazil international border crossings, and are as follows: International Bridge Commander 
Andresito and the San Antonio-Santo Antônio do Sudoeste of the Misiones Province, and 
the International Bridge “Paraje Rosales” of Santa Catarina, Santo Tomé-São Borja 
Integration Bridge, and the International Bridge Paso de Los Libres of the Corrientes 
Province. 
C. BORDER THREATS 
A 2018 Presidential Decree in Argentina has categorized activities harmful to the 
nation-state’s National Defense as “new threats,” some relating to events at Argentina’s 
political borders. The specific items that translate to the borderlands include illegal 
immigration; immigrant traffic; uncontrolled migration of refugees; terrorism; and illicit 
arms, drug, and people trafficking.88 An alarming fact about President Macri’s decree that 
pinpointed Argentina’s “new threats” was that some of these illicit activities have been 
occurring for nearly a century. For instance, illegal drug trafficking has occurred since the 
early 20th century. Some of the earliest accounts of illegal drug use for recreational 
purposes occurred in Argentine tango clubs in the 1920s.89 As the night scene cultures for 
cocaine grew, so did the demand for the illicit substance and the need for cross-border 
transiting. The first two cocaine trafficking incidents occurred in 1962, with the arrests of 
56 people and the seizure of roughly 3.3 kilos in one incident and the seizure of 848 grams 
in another, in the province of La Salta near the Bolivian border.90 Furthermore, Argentina 
participated in aircraft smuggling to national coca-users throughout this time period, from 
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the 1950s to 1970s.91 More recent trends shown in Figure 13 demonstrate how these 
national threats continue to infiltrate the Argentine borderlands. 
The U.S. State Department recently released a 10-year survey that examined illegal 
drug use in the Western Hemisphere, demonstrating demand in the Southern Cone. 
Argentina was amongst the highest-ranking countries during that time period which began 
in 2001, and was primarily caused by drug use under 18 years old.92 The study specifically 
found an area of grave concern for the secondary school youths of Argentina. Obtaining 
cocaine was easier in Argentina than anywhere in the hemisphere, with 21 percent of 
secondary school students able to locate cocaine, locally known as paco.93 The same study 
also demonstrated rising rates of Argentine youth using other types of drugs, including 
marijuana and inhalants. During the same period between 2001 and 2011, the prevalence 
of secondary school students using marijuana increased by nearly seven percent, and the 
prevalence of inhalant use increased by two percent.94 Recent statistics show an increase 
in drug seizures in Argentina, demonstrating the continuous threat of illegal drugs in the 
region. Between 2016 and 2018 the amounts of marijuana and cocaine seized by 
Argentina’s federal security forces increased to over 50 percent.95 These statistics do not 
necessarily represent increased drug trafficking through Argentina’s borders, but provide 
evidence that the contemporary existence of drug demand within the nation-state. 
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Figure 13. Crime Categories in Argentina’s Provinces.96 
D. BORDER SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 
The emergence of Argentina’s smart border will assist the homeland security 
mission against international threats, and it bears a resemblance to another smart border in 
the Western Hemisphere, specifically the U.S.-Mexico’s border. Israel Aerospace 
Industries installed Argentina’s smart border system, which was operational by October 
2019.97 According to Eugenio Burzaco, Argentine Secretary of Security, the border 
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surveillance system helps protect Argentina against illegal drug smuggling and “is very 
similar to the system used at U.S. borders.”98 Confirmed data shows that there is cocaine 
smuggling into Argentina from Bolivia, while marijuana enters Argentina from the TBA. 
To monitor and interdict this smuggling activity, the smart border system uses fixed 
sensors, radars, vehicles, patrol ships, drones and satellites.99 The smart border concept 
revolves around Argentina’s four Command and Control Centers in La Quiaca, Salvador 
Mazza, Aguas Blancas, and Puerto Iguazú.100 Vehicles and sensors provide the control 
centers’ intelligence on illegal crossings at the border regions, which include illicit 
trespassing on land, air, or the river boundaries separating Paraguay and Brazil from 
Argentina. 
A smart border is a force multiplier in the detection of illegal border crossings. 
Argentina’s surveillance technologies assist Argentina’s border agency in identifying the 
borderlands that harbor illicit traffic. This function coincides with the national defense 
mission of the Argentine National Gendarmerie’s Repression and Prevention Police: the 
deterrence of cross-border smuggling.101 In support of Argentina’s national defense 
mission, the Argentine National Gendarmerie’s smart border findings indicate the border 
regions with the most illegal crossings. Once these hot borders are established, assessments 
determine the resources necessary to achieve the political objective of stopping and 
prosecuting narcotics traffickers. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The problem at the northern borderlands that the government of Argentina is 
responding to drug trafficking and the illicit border crossings. One way to combat these 
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threats could be through technology as a force multiplier for the agencies responsible for 
homeland defense. Although the adoption of border surveillance technologies could 
someday contribute to decreasing illegal entry and contraband in the region, this smart 
border methodology is new for Argentina’s government and will take some time until 
Buenos Aires can determine if these technologies are successful or unsuccessful. While the 
system has only been operational for approximately one year, the force multiplying 
technologies have not yet produced evidence to show an increase in the Argentine National 
Gendarmerie’s capacity for borderland protection through distribution chain interruption 
and decreases in smuggling numbers. One example that could assist in Argentina’s 
decisions in the border region is the southern U.S. border. Nearly two-decades have elapsed 
since the hardening of the U.S.-Mexico border, and this smart border illustrates many 
advantages, disadvantages, and lessons learned for the Argentina-Bolivia border region to 
incorporate into their structure. 
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III. U.S.-MEXICO CASE STUDY 
The U.S.-Mexico borderlands are unlike anywhere else in the world. As the most 
traveled land crossing on earth, the U.S. southern border is also one of the most heavily 
fortified border regions.102 However, the beginnings of these borderlands date to the early 
19th century and evolved through numerous territory exchanges, ultimately creating 
today’s 1,954-mile boundary between the nation-states. These land exchanges included 
settlements and townships that would later become adjacent border cities which presently 
require granted access from one nation-state to the next. The following literature examines 
the origin behind the border, geography and geopolitics, and bilateral relations that impact 
these borderlands. The U.S.-Mexico border is the most traversed border in the world 
because of many reasons, including economic relations, bilateral national policies, and 
recent concerns of illicit crossings of migrants and traffickers. Although these illicit 
crossings may be disguised as legal traffic at U.S.-Mexico entry control points, rural 
Arizona and New Mexico border regions of Mexico are the focal points of these illegal 
crossings. 
One aspect of crossings is illicit traffickers utilizing legitimate means across points 
of entry, or those using illegitimate methods to bring contraband for distribution and sales. 
These scenarios exhibit the importance of international point of entry, and how effective 
these checkpoints can be in denying illicit traffic from entering the U.S. One tool the CBP 
uses to combat illegal trafficking is surveillance systems, which act as a force multiplier to 
supplement the agents in the field. Consequently, data and statistics on crossings and 
technology utilization are tools to determine if these border deployments are stopping illicit 
traffic flows from Mexico. Moreover, further investigation can determine if these border 
control technologies are contributing to stability or instability in the borderlands. While 
evidence shows that border security technologies have contributed to CBP prosecutions 
and seizures of contraband, the root causes of northern flow from Mexico into the U.S. are 
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far from resolved. Rather than using a physical wall to create the illusion of border security, 
diplomatically establishing mechanisms would allow for an entrance process into the U.S 
with greater capacity, which would in-turn relieve illicit traffic at the U.S.-Mexico border. 
A. BACKGROUND OF REGION 
The origin behind the U.S.-Mexico border dates to the beginning of the 19th century 
when a large swath of today’s Central U.S. was purchased from France. The 1803 
acquisition, known as the Louisiana Purchase, helped fund Napoleon Bonaparte’s armies 
in preparation for the French War, and became the first time the U.S. shared a border with 
Spain’s Mexico.103 Approximately 50 years later, the two final exchanges of land 
following the Mexican-American War left the border as it is today. The Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, which was signed on February 2, 1848, gave the U.S. lands known 
today as California to the eastern territories of Colorado, New Mexico, and the western 
regions of Texas.104 The final treaty, which gave the south-western lands between Yuma, 
AZ, and Las Cruces, NM, to the U.S., was signed on December 30, 1853 and named the 
Gadsden Purchase.105 The present-day U.S.-Mexico border has remained the same 
geographically since the 1850s. 
The U.S.-Mexico border is an international boundary that uses local terrain, and 
bilateral relations to manage its national interests of security and commerce. The physical 
topography of the border from east to west begins at the intersection of the Rio Grande and 
the Gulf of Mexico. The Rio Grande River, which acts as a natural border, extends from 
El Paso into the Gulf of Mexico for a total 1,255 miles.106 The remainder of the border 
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extends west from El Paso until intersecting the Pacific Ocean and is artificially drawn to 
complete the 1,954-mile boundary. Along this border lies economic partnerships 
demonstrating bilateral relations and national interests of the U.S. and Mexico. The border 
towns along this corridor are reliant on each other’s commerce and trade, but have juggled 
these economic interests alongside international security since the events of 9/11. The U.S.-
Mexico Border Partnership Agreement, known as the Smart Border Accord that was signed 
on March 22, 2002, is a bilateral arrangement concentrating on the “safe and secure flow 
of people and goods and… border infrastructure.”107 
Recent U.S. policies and multilateral agreements have affected the U.S.-Mexico 
border through the use of border deployments, leaving a hardened border where a 
minimally secured borderland once stood. Through a series of U.S. operations, beginning 
in the early 1990s, the border has become often impassable for legitimate and illegitimate 
border crossers in regions of California and Texas. Additional funding, infrastructure, and 
manpower were distributed to multiple U.S. locations in the 1990s, in an effort to counter 
illicit entry and narcotics trafficking. The San Diego region’s Operation Hold the Line in 
1993, Operation Gatekeeper of El Paso in 1994, Operation Rio Grande Valley of McAllen 
Texas in 1997, and Operation Safeguard of Arizona in 1999, all demanded resources to 
combat illegal concerns at the border.108 Additionally, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 resulted in Mexico City’s termination of tariffs on 
agriculture exports to the U.S. and Canada, and this happened concurrently to the policy 
changes that militarized the state of the border.109 These political and economic changes 
left Mexico’s agrarian sector in an economic decline, and left the national boundary, which 
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was once traversed with minimal regulation, in the hands of border deployment 
reinforcements. 
Since the 21st century, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico has changed 
due to decreased migrations into the U.S. and the Mérida Initiative, which strengthened 
immigration control along the U.S.-Mexico border. The late 20th century marked one of 
the largest historical international migrations from Mexico to the U.S., but the population 
flow has eased since the early 2000s. Some evidence has associated the decreased 
migration flows with the U.S. economic decline that occurred in the early 21st century.110 
The attraction of an economically declining nation-state was lower for those looking to 
find financial stability outside of Mexico. Another recent change at the border involves 
bilateral efforts to improve border security and traffic processing along the U.S.-Mexico 
corridor. Pillar Three of the Mérida Initiative, titled “Creating a ‘21st-Century Border,’” 
became a medium for both nations to “[facilitate] the licit flow of people, commerce, and 
trade through U.S. ports of entry while securing the border against threats.”111 Although 
measurements of the pillar’s effectiveness have gone unseen, its results tend to get lumped 
with criminal apprehensions, training standards for law enforcement, and drug seizure 
totals. However, the processes at the U.S.-Mexico border that changed due to the Mérida 
Initiative include mechanisms that assist the CBP in identifying illicit goods, which include 
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the Free and Secure 
Trade (FAST) programs.112 U.S. analysts are asking for more reporting on the initiatives 
so Congress can identify what the $3.1 billion has achieved since the 2008 signing.113 
In the aftermath of new security at the border, the majority of those willing to make 
the journey from Mexico into the U.S. undetected are forced to travel through Arizona’s 
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harsh terrain. One route used by travelers heading through Arizona crosses a 2.8 million-
acre Indian reservation. According to Mike Wilson, a humanitarian and member of the 
Tohono O’odham Nation, “… the Baboquivari trail across the Tohono O’odham Indian 
Nation… is the deadliest migrant trail in the U.S.”114 A common destination for many of 
these travelers is Interstate 8, which is a four-to five-day hike in 100+ degree heat and 
desert conditions, explains U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Agent Andy Adame.115 This harsh 
environment equates to high mortality rates. Over an 11-year span, Humane Borders 
humanitarian organization that tracks migration through the north of this region—
calculated 2,269 migrant deaths and mapped the locations of the deaths in relation to water 
stations as seen in Figure 14. It is difficult to determine if surveillance technologies have 
increased or decreased mortality rates, but the decisions of U.S. policy makers and CBP 
enforcement influenced migrants into these dangerous terrains. 
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The 2,269 deaths in relation to water stations from October 1999 through March 2012, 
provided by Humane Borders Incorporated. 
Figure 14. Arizona Crossings from 1999 to 2012.116 
B. HUMANITARIANS AND POLICY AT THE BORDER  
Many migrants entering the U.S. from Mexico are searching for a better life for 
themselves and their loved ones. One perspective comes from a former guide, or pollero, 
who once led groups across the border into the U.S.: “These people have the courage to 
leave everything to go [to the U.S.] … they want to give their children something 
better.”117 Research has shown that a large percentage of Mexicans who migrate to the 
U.S. are family patriarchs in search of opportunities that benefit their families 
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wellbeing.118 Another man from the city of Altar Sonora, Mexico adds to the conversation, 
explaining that a profitable journey to the U.S. may lead to a single migration rather than 
multiple trips.119 Finally, another first-hand account comes from a husband and father from 
the city of Hidalgo, who was witnessed travelling by Mike Wilson within the Tohono 
O’odham Indian Nation. Upon receipt of donated supplies to continue his journey, the 
Hidalgo resident described his arrival to the U.S. as a way to find work to support his wife 
in need of surgery, and his young children who were awaiting his return in Mexico.120 
Although these justifications cannot account for all migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico 
border, they provide a glimpse into why this dangerous voyage is a necessary risk for many. 
These migrants, however, are not alone in their journey towards a land of 
opportunity. With the help of humanitarian organizations and good Samaritans, the nearly 
impossible trek into Arizona can be accomplished. With dehydration being the greatest risk 
for migrants walking the deserts south of Phoenix and Tucson, water becomes a deciding 
factor in the survival of these travelers. By means of water stations provided by 
organizations and humanitarians, such as Humane Borders and Mike Wilson, and through 
water distribution by aircraft by attaching bottles to small parachutes, migrants have greater 
odds of survival.121 A recent study also names four organizations that provide 
humanitarian aid at Arizona’s international border: Humane Borders, Tucson Samaritans, 
Green Valley-Sahuarita Samaritans, and No More Deaths.122 Although some Americans 
believe these acts will encourage citizens from Mexico to enter the U.S. illegally, Mike 
Wilson defends these unselfish acts. As a Tohono O’odham Indian Nation resident, Mr. 
Wilson explains that migrants’ crossings had occurred before water was available and 
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would continue even if these refilling stations were eliminated. The lack of resources would 
only add to the death toll, not deter migrants from making the trip into the U.S. 
Many U.S. citizens residing near the U.S.-Mexico border policy space harbor 
diverse outlooks regarding the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border. Brownsville, TX and 
Arizona residents were interviewed about recent U.S. government actions and the results 
were varied. Some viewpoints were of confusion and support. Border residents are puzzled 
as to why the government perceives asylum seekers as threats to national defense, and they 
are willing to offer aid by providing shade for sun-relief, and food and water to refill their 
reserves.123 Other U.S. residents at the borderlands share a conservative view of migrants 
crossing the border from Mexico. A militia group, Texas Minutemen, is made up of local 
residents who report illegal border findings to border patrol agents and law enforcement. 
They are aware that drug trafficking is a concern between the Brownsville port of entry 
and the Gulf of Mexico, and are willing to patrol these Texas regions to ensure migrants 
enter the country licitly through an entry control point.124 Both views seem to share a 
common understanding which is best represented by Sean Carroll, Executive Director of 
the Kino Border Initiative. “People are concerned for their safety. They are concerned that 
there is a real lack of order. We need security. We need safety. But I don’t believe border 
security and respect for human dignity are mutually exclusive. We can do both.”125 
Viewpoints of U.S. citizens residing near the U.S.-Mexico border, regarding border 
security surveillance technologies, are more difficult to research, however recent events 
and organizations demonstrate what local inhabitants and democratic unions think of the 
employment of these privacy-invasive technologies. In 2017 a Texas resident removed a 
camera placed on his son’s property in Encinal, Texas, which belonged to the CBP, and his 
rationale for doing so centered around the sensor being an invasion of privacy due to 
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unauthorized surveillance.126 Expanding on these thoughts, the Fourth Amendment 
protects U.S. citizens “against unreasonable searches and seizures,” however the argument 
lies in deciding if these border imaging sensors are in fact reasonable.127 The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is an organization that focuses on the employment of 
surveillance systems at the U.S.-Mexico border and the infringement of Fourth 
Amendment rights. While being an advocate for Fair Information Practice Principles, the 
ACLU identifies the deployment of surveillance apparatus as much quicker “than our 
social, political, educational, or legal systems can react,” ultimately sidestepping populace 
consent until democratic mechanisms catch up to the post implemented systems.128 
Although border surveillance is a force multiplier for border agencies, this benefit alone is 
not worth undermining civil rights the U.S. was founded upon. 
C. BORDER THREATS 
To fully secure the U.S.-Mexico border from threats, the problem lies not only in 
the unmanned regions that invite illicit traffic into the country, but also at entry control 
points that manage vast amounts of commerce each year. To illustrate the amount of 
commercial traffic in this region, nearly 13-million trucks and container trucks crossed in 
2019 at the U.S.-Mexico international border.129 According to Harvey Pothier, former U.S. 
Customs Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Office of Air Interdiction, searching every 
vehicle for illegal activity at the western side of the border would be an impossible task: 
“if we examined every truck for narcotics arriving into the United States along the 
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Southwest border... Customs would back up the truck traffic bumper-to-bumper into 
Mexico City in just two weeks—15.8 days. In 15.8 days, there would be 95,608 trucks 
backed up into Mexico. That’s 1,177 miles of trucks.”130 These border entry points, 
however, are not the only thoroughfares that challenge border agents. The desolate 
uninhabited regions of the U.S.-Mexico border also create a nearly unmanageable security 
concern for the homeland. According to the former U.S. Border Patrol Tucson Sector Chief 
Robert Gilbert, many of these regions are nearly inaccessible due to minimal roadways for 
vehicular access, mountainous terrain, and remoteness.131 
D. POINTS OF ENTRY 
The U.S.-Mexico border contains a total of 47 ports of entry, with each checkpoint 
having individual attributes that distinguish one border checkpoint from another.132 Due 
to the large number of ports of entry, this chapter only analyzes the highest transited entry 
points. Figure 15 displays the top five control points in the border region from most 
trafficked to least: San Ysidro, CA; El Paso, TX: Laredo, TX: Otay Mesa, CA: and 
Brownsville, TX. At each port of entry the governing organizations are focused on traffic 
capacity. Some entry points have recently modernized while others are planning for 
construction and expansion. Roughly 15-million people reside in counties along the U.S.-
Mexico border, and surface trade between the U.S. and Mexico has increased from $100 
billion to $400 billion in a 17 year span beginning in 1995.133 Border traffic numbers are 
expected to rise because of these demands, which gives these ports of entry good reasons 
to streamline processing and increase traffic capacity. 
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Figure 15. Top Five U.S.-Mexico Border Crossings of 2019.134 
The San Ysidro, California port of entry seen in Figure 16, is the most used land 
port of entry in the Western Hemisphere and the busiest land border crossing in the world. 
31-million passenger vehicles cross this border point annually.135 This number does not 
account for bus passengers or pedestrians, which increased the 2019 number by nearly 11-
million border crossers.136 The heavy flow of traffic between San Diego and Tijuana has 
become more streamlined due to a recent construction project at the San Ysidro crossing. 
The expansion project, totaling roughly $741 million, added 36 pedestrian lanes, 12 
northbound lanes (two being reversible), eight northbound vehicle processing lanes, 10 
southbound lanes, eight southbound vehicle processing lanes, a transit center for public 
transportation access with pickup areas for taxis and private autos, an employee parking 
structure, and an administration building.137 Srikrishnan associates this expansion with a 
recent estimate from the San Diego Association of Governments, which forecasts an 87 
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percent increase in San Ysidro port of entry traffic by 2030. With these advancements 
improving traffic capacity, there is no sign of over-normal wait times in the near future. 
Furthermore, the U.S. has given commuters and travelers alternative methods to plan for 
heavy border traffic. Ballooning at the San Ysidro port of entry is less likely due to the use 
of information technology. With the creation of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Border Wait Time Application, those travelling through the control point via bus, personal 
vehicle, or on foot can plan for wait times by viewing real-time information from their 
mobile device.138 Between the port of entry’s capacity expansion and through the use of 
handheld technologies, travelers can rest assured that the San Ysidro border crossing will 
continue to successfully handle the enormous volume of traffic for decades to come. 
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With 31 million crossings per year, this entry control point is the busiest land border 
crossing in the world. 
Figure 16. San Ysidro-Zona Norte Border Map.139  
Figure 17 illustrates the world’s largest international border metroplex, connecting 
El Paso, Texas to Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, which consists of three individual crossings, 
specifically Paso Del Norte, Stanton and Zaragoza.140 Approximately $25 billion in gross 
domestic product (GDP) and $81.9 billion in total travelled through these border crossings 
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in 2018.141 Processing this quantity of commerce traffic, mass transit, and private autos, 
all totaling over 13 million in 2018, requires careful planning by the CBP.142 Like the San 
Ysidro-Tijuana crossing, El Paso is working to meet future requirements. On August 28, 
2020, the House of Representatives passed an appropriations bill which includes $700 
million for El Paso’s Bridge of the Americas to “increase processing capacity, enhance 
security, and facilitate trade and travel volumes.”143 The heavy volume and upcoming 
changes in capacity point to El Paso’s focus on a secure and streamlined entry point. 
One recent concern at the El Paso borderlands is the state’s ability to handle a large 
influx in immigration. In 2019 the Homeland Security inspector general discovered that a 
CBP immigration holding facility in El Paso capable of handling only 125-detainees were 
holding up to 900-migrant detainees.144 The fallout from this violation of human rights has 
sparked an increase in immigrant capacity in the region. The CBP has deployed temporary 
facilities to handle the numbers crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, which are placeholders 
for permanent locations in El Paso and Yuma that will increase detainee capacity by 1,800 
people.145 It is concerning that the detection of human rights violations was the motive for 
the agency’s recent expansion of migrant holding capacity, but with temporary and long-
term plans in place the city of El Paso will continue to serve as a location for those seeking 
refuge in the U.S. 
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As the largest border metroplex in the world, roughly $25 billion in GDP travelled through 
this crossing in 2018. 
Figure 17. El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Border Map.146 
The Laredo-Nuevo Laredo border crossing is an economic centerpiece in the Texas-
Mexico junction, displayed in Figure 18, and has recently completed updates to increase 
traffic capacity. The Laredo port of entry was responsible for $71.7 billion in GDP in 2018, 
and employed nearly 500,000 people during the same year.147 The port of entry has 
recently undergone $77 million in renovations at the Juarez-Lincoln International Bridge, 
providing expansions in vehicle inspection areas, public transit, employee office space, 
audio surveillance equipment, and is now using non-intrusive imaging technology for 
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inspecting vehicles and baggage.148 The CBP states that the daily average of bus traffic at 
the Laredo port of entry has increased to 125-buses with roughly 5,600 passengers, which 
was a major consideration for the 2019 advancements. Moreover, a recent study has shown 
expedient urbanized growth in the region, more than that of U.S. megacities from 1985 to 
2014.149 The recent expansion and technologies focused on border-traffic management 
will continue to be useful as forecasts predict increasing vehicle and pedestrian traffic. 
 
Being the economic flagship of Texas, in a single year the port of entry was responsible 
for $71.7 billion in GDP and the employment of 500 thousand people. 
Figure 18. Laredo-Nuevo Laredo Border Map.150 
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The border control point in Otay Mesa lies at the south-east outskirts of San Diego 
and joins the cities of Otay Mesa, CA and Garita De Otay, Baja California, as shown in 
Figure 19. Over the last decade, the commercial traffic volume has increased at this port of 
entry by 45 percent (combined with Tecate’s border crossing) and facilitates “about 73 
percent of the total trade moving through the California-Mexico border.”151 As the 
workhorse for the west coast economy, the Otay Mesa-Garita De Otay port of entry is 
beginning an expansion project to invest in the critical border infrastructure. With an 
expected completion date of spring 2023, the $137.2 million plan will incorporate double 
the current pedestrian lanes, increase commercial inspection areas by six, increase 
employee and visitor parking, and build stations for bus inspections and plant inspection 
stations funded by the Department of Agriculture.152 This expansion project is warranted 
when comparing average wait times in Otay Mesa to those in Laredo, TX, another 
economically-driven entry point. While the Laredo commercial lane wait times range from 
44 to 78 minutes between the hours of 6am to 6pm, Otay Mesa’s wait times within the 
same criteria range from 58 to 104 minutes.153 Compared to the commercial traffic at each 
port of entry in 2019, Laredo’s 2.3 million trucks to Otay Mesa approaching 1 million, the 
San Diego commercial hub needs a reformation before further delays contribute to 
ballooning.154 
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While sharing 73 percent of all California-Mexico trade, the Otay Mesa Land Port of Entry 
is becoming even busier with a recent 45 percent increase in commercial traffic. 
Figure 19. Otay Mesa-Garita De Otay Border Map.155 
The Brownsville-Matamoros entry control point is responsible for $15.4 billion of 
Texas’ $336 billion total imports and exports, and is represented in Figure 20.156 The 
border crossing composition allowing these economic crossings are four bridges spanning 
the Rio Grande, specifically the Veterans International Bridge at Los Tomates, the 
Gateway International Bridge, the Brownsville & Matamoros Bridge, and the Brownsville 
 
155 Source: Otay Mesa-Garita De Otay border map, Google Maps, accessed July 22, 2020, 
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West Rail Bridge.157 Recent news at the Brownsville border crossing has described the use 
of smart border technology on pedestrian traffic. Biometric facial comparison technology 
was implemented by the CBP in February 2020, with the objective of positively identifying 
and photographing U.S. citizens and noncitizens entering the U.S.158 Additionally, the 
Texas Department of Transportation has another upcoming project to modernize the port 
of entry. The state’s Unified Transportation Program Plan for fiscal year 2021 is focusing 
on interstate infrastructure at the Texas-Mexico border region and has plans to expand 
Interstate 69 East, which winds south to the Veteran International Bridge.159 Another local 
expansion project has allotted $25.6 million to improve routes to the Port of Brownsville. 
According to Brownsville’s Navigation District Chairman John Reed is “critical to the 
region’s future success in domestic and international trade.”160 While this U.S.-Mexico 
port of entry does not have the highest number of crossings annually, the City of 
Brownsville continues to build a framework capable of handling larger volumes of vehicles 
and pedestrians. 
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The entry control point uses four bridges to contribute $15.4 billion to Texas’ import and 
exports. 
Figure 20. Brownsville-Matamoros Border Map.161 
E. BORDER SECURITY TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE 
To provide the USBP with the necessary tools to complete the mission of border 
security, numerous force-multiplying capabilities are employed in the rural U.S.-Mexico 
border regions. Border agents who defend the U.S. homeland have been employing USBP 
technologies to supplement the physical wall and the national boundary. A recent BBC 
News report by Nick Kwek, titled The Tech That Helps Keep Watch Over the US-Mexico 
Border, explains border surveillance technologies that are being used in the Nogales, 
 
161 Source: Brownsville-Matamoros border map, Google Maps, assessed on July 22, 2020, 
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Arizona region. The USBP maintains border integrity through the use of fixed and mobile 
sensors and equipment. Fixed equipment includes Remote Video Surveillance Systems 
(RVSSs), buried motion sensors, and Integrated Fixed Towers (IFTs) outfitted with long-
range video, thermal and infrared imaging, and radar.162 The report includes mobile 
equipment consisting of surveillance trucks with thermal range finders and laser pointers, 
and encrypted communications gear with GPS beacons for coordinate identification. These 
border security surveillance systems, or similar systems, are used throughout the U.S.-
Mexico border along with Predator B drones, military aerostats, mobile surveillance 
vehicles, and surveillance aircraft, as seen in Figure 22.163 
With the following border security technologies being stationary or unable to travel 
large distances in short periods of time, the need for drone technology that can transit and 
monitor large swaths of the U.S.-Mexico border can assist border surveillance gaps and 
add redundancy to employed border technologies. To better understand UAV use at the 
United States’ southern border, Gizmodo released a flight log database specifically for CBP 
drones, recording flights in the U.S.-Mexico border region for one year. Between June 
2019 to June 2020, the CBP UAVs that were operational at the border included MQ-9 
Predator B tail numbers CBP 108, CBP 110, CBP 113, CBP 213, and CBP 125.164 
Although the entirety of the border was monitored throughout the year, the border region 
along the Rio Grande River contained the most drone flights, specifically in the corridor 
shown in Figure 21. 
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that-helps-keep-watch-over-the-us-mexico-border. 
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From 2019 to 2020, this Texas region was the most transited by CBP drones than any other 
U.S.-Mexico border area. 
Figure 21. U.S. Drone Use in Texas.165 
Beyond surveilling wide expanses of closed border, new border technologies can 
also expedite traffic at designated ports of entry. Programs such as Secure Electronic 
Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) and FAST use technology to expedite 
the flow of traffic at designated ports of entry. SENTRI uses pre-clearance to allow low-
risk travelers to transit into the U.S. from Mexico.166 Upon approval by the CBP, the 
applicant receives a five year membership allowing him/her to traverse SENTRI primary 
 
165 Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Border Security Results;” Texas-Mexico border 
map, Google Maps, accessed November 8, 2020, https://www.google.com/maps/@27.260641,-
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166 “Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
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lanes into the U.S., which offers expedited entry for private vehicles.167 Similarly, the 
FAST border program also uses pre-clearance processes, however it is designed for 
commercial vehicles entering U.S. land ports of entry.168 Technologies that support these 
programs include electronic databases that store traveler biometrics and personally 
identifiable information, in order to verify a person’s identity prior to permittance of border 
entry. 
The electronic databases used for storing border crossing data are primarily cloud-
based, and securing personally identifiable information stored in these databases is a major 
priority for the CBP. Four preventative measures are implemented to ensure the 
safekeeping of information. First, the transfer of data between the DHS system and the 
verification system occurs over a Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program-
enabled cloud service requiring two-factor authentication and encryption in accordance 
with the “National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 
800-144, Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing.”169 Second, 
CBP biometric templates are only recognized within the proprietary verification system 
software and create a photo archive unable to be reverse-engineered.170 Third, 12-hours 
after identity verification “the CBP discards photos of U.S. Citizens and exempt aliens,” 
and photos of in-range crossers can be archived in the DHS Automated Biometric 
Identification System if necessary, or deleted no-later than fourteen days.171 Fourth, facial 
image data is stored within a secure cloud topology and retaining such data by airport 
agencies or cruise liners is prohibited by the CBP.172 
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Facial comparison is one technology recently implemented at U.S.-Mexico land 
ports of entry to provide the CBP with tools to ensure the correct identities of each person 
that crosses the border into the U.S. In 2017, CBP facial recognition has been used at 
airports at departure gates, and in 2018 facial comparison technology was tested at land 
entry control points for pedestrians and vehicles.173 Since the initial testing phase, the CBP 
is conducting biometric facial comparison pilot tests at five land ports of entry: 
Brownsville, TX, El Paso, TX, Laredo, TX, Nogales, AZ, and San Luis, AZ.174  All five 
entry control points provide facial recognition for pedestrians on foot, but only the 
Brownsville, TX location is testing to provide biometric recording for passengers of 
vehicles. With cameras located in U.S. entry and exit lanes, the pilot program results in 
photos meeting standards 90 to 95 percent for travelers in the front seats, and for passengers 
in the back seats less than 50 percent.175 More pilot programs that use vehicle facial 
recognition technology to continue to “examine how identity information gathered through 
the cameras could be used to assist CBP officers in conducting border crossing inspections 
of vehicles” and to assist in attaining entry-exit records at the U.S.-Mexico ports of 
entry.176  
Additionally, Nick Kwek describes two future technologies that are being tested to 
advance the USBPs situational awareness in the border region. The first is an air asset drone 
equipped with high resolution cameras for facial recognition, and the second is a mobile 
navigation tool enabling agents to track each other’s real-time location on a portable 
electronic device.177 With these supplemental resources to aid the USBP’s agents, the 
relationship between technologies and the completion of Homeland Defense objectives 
demonstrates a coordinated effort. 
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Figure 22. U.S.-Mexico Border Technology Employment Map.178
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F. MEASURING SUCCESS AT THE BORDER 
Defining success in the U.S.-Mexico border is the first step in measuring the USBPs 
productivity at the southern border. With President Trump’s push toward building a wall 
along the U.S-Mexico border front to stop illegal immigration, the success or failure of this 
initiative is the first place to start for this discussion. In theory, this border control measure 
looks promising in reducing illegal traffic along the U.S.-Mexico border, but in reality, the 
border-wall gives drug runners and traffickers a reason to find alternative methods into the 
U.S. Recent news examines the methods smugglers and traffickers are using to successfully 
enter the country undetected. The CBP and USBP are being bypassed through the use of 
tunnels, airborne smuggling, seaborne smuggling, legal ports of entry, postal and mailing 
services, cutting holes through the border wall, and sending contraband over the wall using 
catapults and trebuchets.179 To create an attainable solution at these borderlands, other 
changes need to occur such as destination desirability and reexamining the process of 
citizenship to decrease the number of illegal crossings, which could ultimately increase the 
probability of detainees at the border being drug runners and traffickers. In a Harvard 
International Review article, Staff Writer Esteban Flores indicates that effective changes 
in law are needed to complement the U.S.-Mexico border wall, which would include 
“making it less desirable for immigrants to work in the United States, or towards making 
the path to citizenship easier.”180 The economic repercussions of repelling immigrants 
seeking employment would negatively impact the U.S. labor workforce, so the latter option 
would most likely be the best scenario. 
Measuring the success of border surveillance technologies lead to a realization that 
surveillance equipment alone is unable to halt illicit cross border movements, but can assist 
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in capturing criminals as a force multiplier that would otherwise go undetected. Between 
the 47 ports of entry lies a vast unmanned landscape that relies on surveillance technologies 
to monitor the border.181 Determining if these modern technologies have created border 
control success has become a topic of interest. A recent case study on the US-Mexico 
border examines the employment of border security technologies, and a determination was 
made that “a direct infusion of equipment or technologies has not been the pivotal factor 
in building a successful border management capability.”182 Surveillance technologies only 
serve as a tool to assist USBP detection of cross border movements, but do not substitute 
legislative processes that would alleviate the urgency of those traveling north into the U.S. 
(as discussed in the previous paragraph). In October 2018, the USBP conducted 474 
apprehensions of border crossers through the aid of small unmanned aerial systems 
aircraft.183 Ultimately, a six-foot-deep and 30-foot-tall border wall and surveillance 
technologies do not stop illegal U.S.-Mexico border crossings, but rather creates 
motivational obstacles for illicit actors to bypass. 
G. REGIONAL STABILITY AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 
An indirect relationship between both Mexico’s remittance inflow trends and the 
Mexican workforce’s economic inequality illustrate negative regional stability in the U.S.-
Mexico’s borderlands. One method of determining stability is to analyze funds being sent 
to loved ones in Mexico. Figure 23 illustrates an upward trend in remittance flows when 
comparing this data to Mexico’s largest remittance contributor, the U.S., which sent 
approximately 25 of 25.7-billion dollars of funds in 2014 alone.184 There are hundreds of 
reasons for sending funds back to Mexico, but one that cannot be ignored is that many 
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migrants do not plan on living in the U.S. for an extended period of time. Often these 
travelers do not find the U.S. a stable nation-state for long-term prosperity, and would 
rather return home to their original place of security. Similarly, the environment at the U.S.-
Mexico border is anything but stable when examining the social relationships between both 
nations. Although upper-echelons of government have made pacts in the form of bilateral 
and multilateral agreements, such as NAFTA, the Merida Initiative, and the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement, middle and lower socioeconomic classes near the borders are 
not seeing the benefits. While globalization has continued to push billions of dollars of 
product each year over the U.S.-Mexico border, these major corporate deals have not 
trickled down to the working classes in Mexico, or the 60 percent of Mexican workers that 
create the informal economy.185 That lack of economic equality is not directly tied to 
border security technologies, but is a problem worth mentioning due to its direct impact on 
U.S.-Mexico borderland stability. 
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Figure 23. Mexico’s Remittance Inflow trends from 1970 to 2018 in USD.186 
H. CONCLUSION 
Tension and disagreements between Mexico and the U.S. during the Mexican-
American war helped form the modern border, and contemporary relations between the 
two nations remain similar. Through implementation of national border policies that 
hardened the U.S.-Mexico border during the 1990s and through the establishment of 
NAFTA, Mexico has experienced physical and economic hostility from the U.S. One 
byproduct of U.S. focus on border security is increased migrant travel in regions of 
southern Arizona and the Baboquivari trail in the Tohono O’odham Indian Nation. The 
harsh environments of these areas result in high mortality rates, leaving those who survive 
the crossing often requiring humanitarian aid from U.S. citizens. U.S. emphasis on 
homeland security has focused on stopping the illicit flow of narcotics, human trafficking, 
and illegal migration. The current U.S. administration has shown a sense of mistrust and 
carelessness in regard to the Mexican people, which is evident by the amounts of money 
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the U.S. pours into border integrity.187 While border infrastructure continues to be a major 
concern for U.S. security and traffic capacity, recent border security initiatives, including 
construction of “The Wall,” lack policy changes to ease the migrant push from the United 
States’ southern neighbors. These policy failures have contributed to a lack of regional 
stability at the U.S.-Mexico border, and is illustrated through remittance flows and 
economic inequality. Border surveillance technologies are helping border agencies achieve 
their goal of reducing illegal crossings, however they do not equate to stability at the U.S.-
Mexico borderlands. 
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IV. U.S.-CANADA CASE STUDY 
A. BACKGROUND OF REGION 
Three events during the 18th and 19th centuries drove the origin of the lower 48 
U.S.-Canada border. The first U.S.-Canada border was created at the conclusion of the 
American War of Independence. The signing of the Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783 
gave the U.S. land that bordered Canada, including the northern territories of New England 
and the Northwest Territory, which encompassed the modern-day regions of Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin.188 Second, the 1803 Louisiana Purchase from France provided 
the U.S. with the northern border regions known as present day North Dakota, Montana, 
and Idaho.189 Finally, the Oregon Treaty of June 15, 1846 created the final separation 
between the U.S. and British Columbia in the regions of Washington and Idaho.190 These 
three events created the 3,987 mile boundary between the U.S. and Canada.191 
A series of natural and artificial borders make up the U.S.-Canada topographical 
boundary. Beginning at the Pacific Ocean, the international border splits Vancouver Island 
and northern Washington at the Salish Sea and the Haro Strait. This natural border becomes 
artificial approximately 20 miles south of Vancouver, where it spans from Washington 
State into Minnesota’s Lake of the Woods. The border then runs north roughly 26 miles 
and transforms into a natural border through the Lake of the Woods following the Rainy 
River in northern Minnesota. Following a series of lakes and rivers, the border then splits 
four of the five Great Lakes, specifically Lake Superior, Lake Huron, Lake Erie, and Lake 
Ontario. After the lakes the international boundary splits the St. Lawrence River and 
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becomes artificial once it spans west to east in upstate New York and northern Vermont. 
Lastly, through a series of natural and artificial transitions, the border divides Quebec and 
New Brunswick from Vermont and Maine until terminating at the North Atlantic Ocean. 
Canada’s sovereign territories, in reference to the U.S. mainland, create geographic 
and political interests that the U.S. is focused upon, specifically national security and 
economic partnerships. The nearly 4,000 mile U.S.-Canada border with 133 land ports of 
entry represents a vulnerability to the U.S., and two events occurring in the 1990s illustrate 
this concern.192 In 1993 terrorists originating from Canada entered the U.S. and targeted 
the North Tower of the World Trade Center, and in 1999 a terrorist carrying explosives 
entered the U.S from Canada with plans to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport.193 
Since these events and the attacks on 9/11, border security agreements between the U.S. 
and Canada, like the U.S. and Canada Smart Border Declaration of 2001, have contributed 
to stronger U.S. national security. The U.S.-Canada border is also responsible for 
maintaining economic relations of both nation-states, specifically at border cities. For 
instance, U.S. and Canada’s Niagara Falls City illustrates a binational linkage through 
reliance on tourism in the region, while other twin cities such as Detroit, Buffalo, and 
Blaine cater to commercial industry.194 The U.S.-Canada international border contains a 
two-thirds concentration of traffic at four cross-border bridges in south Ontario, 
demonstrating a geopolitical focus in urban regions.195 
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S.-Canada border has witnessed 
tighter security which has negatively impacted the economic sector in wait times, annual 
costs, and policy-influenced incentives. In border regions such as Ontario and Michigan, 
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the aftermath of 9/11 created a time-delay for commerce traffic due to a lack in a customs 
union which resulted in longer wait times due to customs checks for each vehicle crossing 
the border.196 The hardened border security “led to longer delays, especially for traffic 
passing from Canada into the U.S. Some estimates placed the annual cost of delays as high 
as $10 billion dollars.”197 This average accounts for delays in not only commercial vehicles 
but the eventual monetary loss of the industrial sector due to delays in both shipping and 
manufacturing. The attacks of September 11, 2001, also spurred a U.S. reaction that 
focused on many aspects of homeland security in the U.S.-Canada border, while placing 
less emphasis on economic border traffic. The U.S. and Canada Smart Border Declaration 
was signed on December 12, 2001, and gave rise to the first smart border. The objective of 
the Presidential declaration was to create a secure border that supports the flow of cross-
border traffic.198 The measures ranged from securing the flow of people and goods, 
supporting infrastructure, and facilitating interagency operations. One recent study 
determined that policies affecting cross-border transportation were not efficiently utilized 
by corporations and businesses based on region, industry, and size.199 Those that had 
higher economic stakes were more likely to implement programs such as FAST to bridge 
the business gaps created by increased border securities. National security has become the 
concentration at the U.S.-Canada border, and cross-border economics are still adapting to 
the security standards. 
Contemporary U.S.-Canada relations post-9/11 have focused on bilateral 
agreements to strengthen the international border security while stabilizing the economy. 
On February 4, 2011, President Obama and Prime Minister Harper signed the Beyond the 
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Border Action Plan to unify security and economics at the shared international border.200 
To achieve a combined security front both governments have collaborated through two 
binational organizations focused on U.S.-Canada border security, specifically the Border 
Enforcement Security Taskforces (BESTs) and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams 
(IBETs).201 Each organization contributes differently to international border security. 
While BEST, led by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), aims to stop 
Transnational Criminal Organizations at land and sea borders, including the U.S.-Canada 
borderlands, IBET operations combine five agencies from both the U.S. and Canada to 
combat national security threats against both countries at specific ports of entry.202 The 
declaration has also focused on facilitating trade and growth in economics and jobs. To 
increase commerce, a truck cargo pre-inspection pilot began on June 18, 2013, and has 
successfully implemented procedures allowing for the CBP to pre-inspect south-bound 
commercial traffic before arriving into the U.S.203 Furthermore, the pilot program 
concentrated at the Peace Bridge Crossing at the Buffalo-Fort Erie border “where cross-
border travel and trade is essential.”204 The pilot became the precursor to the U.S.-Canada 
Agreement on Land, Rail, Marine, and Air (LRMA) Transport Preclearance, creating the 
first full preclearance system for cross-border traffic between each nation by allowing 
screening agents into the other nations jurisdiction for pre-screening purposes.205 
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B. BORDER THREATS 
Although the U.S.-Canada border is a relatively stable region, at the beginning of 
the 1950s Canada relied on the U.S. for protection from advanced external threats, 
specifically the occupation of Canada by external communist powers. During the cold war 
era, Canada depended on U.S.-led North American defenses “to ensure national control 
over the Canadian territory.”206 Without Canada’s territorial sovereignty, the border 
immediately becomes a vulnerability to U.S. homeland security if foreign communist 
powers occupied our northern flank, which explains why the U.S. favors hemispheric 
protection. Moreover, smart border vulnerabilities are also a major concern for U.S.-
Canada border security. If a hostile state actor or group successfully penetrates the multiple 
tiers of border security, evidence of security failure would poison the work and cooperation 
between Canada and the U.S. in the security and economic sector, possibly leading to a 
governmental blame-game between nations.207 Reforms would then begin. Scenarios that 
would threaten the borderlands the most are international threats that can apply pressure at 
the international border if infiltration is successful. 
C. POINTS OF ENTRY 
The lower 48 U.S.-Canada border contains 133 land ports of entry along the 39th 
parallel, all with individualities that distinguish themselves from each other.208 Similar to 
the previous chapter, the large number of entry points results in the analysis of only the top 
five transited border entry points, specifically Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY; Detroit, MI; 
Blaine, WA; Port Huron, MI, and Champlain-Rouses Point, NY. These ports of entry are 
focused on trade efficiency and the safe transportation of goods, while maintaining a secure 
border region free of homeland threats. 
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Figure 24. Top Five U.S.-Canada Border Crossings of 2019.209 
The Niagara Falls CBP border station is responsible for 73 miles of borderlands in 
upstate New York.210 With Canadian and U.S. agencies responsible for nearly six million 
crossings in 2019, consisting of buses, personal vehicles, and trucks, the Buffalo-Niagara 
Falls port of entry accounts for the most border crossings along the U.S.-Canada border.211 
The Niagara River separates the two countries and forces vehicles to cross either the Peace 
Bridge, the Lewiston-Queenston Bridge, the Whirlpool Rapids Bridge, or the Rainbow 
Bridge.212 Rail bridges are the only alternative to crossing this land port of entry. A major 
benefit of having several methods to cross this international boundary is the reduction of 
entry ballooning. If routes become congested, an alternate bridge is only 30 minutes away. 
However, one vulnerability at this port of entry is the growing tourism industry, which 
accounts for 8 million annual visitors at Niagara Falls alone.213 From 2013 to 2018, hotel 
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purchasing increased by $40 million, tourism spending rose by 11 percent, and tourism 
employment grew by 10 percent, creating 33 thousand jobs in Erie County.214 If this trend 
continues in the Buffalo-Niagara Falls region, a recommendation to the local governments 
of Canada and the U.S., specifically the Regional Municipality of Niagara in Ontario and 
Niagara Country in New York, should consider increasing traffic capacity to address future 
traffic congestion. 
Uniquely, the Buffalo-Niagara Falls region, shown in Figure 25, has two sets of 
border cities that create the region’s cultural identity from Canadian and U.S. perspectives 
and supports economic links between the twin cities. The most popular border city of the 
two is Niagara Falls, Canada and Niagara Falls, U.S. The first noticeable difference 
between the cities is population; Niagara Falls, Canada has 88 thousand and Niagara Falls, 
U.S. has 47 thousand residents.215 One reason for the population disparity is due to each 
nation’s adoption of industry in their respective Niagara Falls. While Canada focused on 
the tourism industry in Niagara Falls, the U.S.-supported industry in Niagara Falls was 
outsourced beginning in the 1950s, due to more competitive wages overseas.216 While 
modern-day Ontario still focuses solely on the tourism industry in Niagara Falls, the New 
York side has begun rebuilding their industrial sector while also competing with Canadian 
tourism.217 
The cities of Buffalo, NY and Fort Erie, Ontario, which lie upriver of Niagara Falls, 
create the second set of border-cities at the Buffalo-Niagara Falls border crossing. The 
population of Buffalo, NY is 891 thousand, and Fort Erie, Ontario sits at 14 thousand 
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inhabitants.218 This region was once a continuous battlefront during the War of 1812, and 
later became a cornerstone of the underground railroad between 1840 and 1860.219 The 
modern-day region is now a frequently travelled corridor with an emphasis on traffic 
throughput over the Niagara River. In 1999, the Peace Bridge implemented a program 
called the Commercial Vehicle Processing Center, which was created to screen cargo in 
Canada destined for the U.S.220 The program was successful because it increased 
commercial clearance rates by over 20 percent. Since 2009, the bridge has been responsible 
for five to six million crossings annually.221 However, this transportation success has not 
helped the city of Buffalo recover from its economic woes. With a high unemployment 
rate, a decreasing population, high crime rates, and a lacking education system, Buffalo, 
NY is not an enticing location for entrepreneurs or established companies to reside in. The 
consequence is Buffalo’s continuous economic slump.222 
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This region incorporates both twin cities of Niagara Falls, Canada and Niagara Falls, U.S, 
and Buffalo, NY and Fort Erie, Ontario. The former manages large volumes of tourism 
traffic, while the latter emphasis is commercial passage. 
Figure 25. Buffalo-Niagara Falls Border Map.223 
The border crossing of Detroit, MI and Windsor, Ontario, shown in Figure 26, was 
responsible for over six million crossings in 2019 alone.224 The two border crossing points 
are the Ambassador Bridge and Windsor Tunnel, both of which hold records on the 
international stage. While the Windsor Tunnel is the only international sub-aqueous vehicle 
 
223 Source: Buffalo-Niagara Falls border map, Google Maps, accessed July 22, 2020, 
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crossing on the planet, the Ambassador Bridge is the world’s largest international 
suspension bridge.225 The Ambassador Bridge alone handles “approximately one quarter 
of all trade between the U.S. and Canada.”226 The CBP bridge is extremely efficient when 
examining average wait times of the continuously open bridge crossing. During peak traffic 
hours on the Ambassador Bridge, the average commercial vehicle wait time fluctuates 
between 16 and 20 minutes per vehicle.227 Ballooning is practically non-existent at this 
entry control point because of platforms focused on efficient screening, such as the FAST 
Program and the Advanced Border Processing Centre.228 These programs streamline the 
customs checkpoint process by allowing customs agents ample time to prescreen 
commercial carrier’s documentation electronically prior to a driver’s arrival, and through 
a “trusted traveler/trusted shipper” plan utilizing eligibility screening and background 
checks of transit personnel.229 One vulnerability of these programs is their reliance on 
information system databases. If these computer systems fail or become inaccurate due to 
system errors, heavy traffic delays would be expected. 
The twin cities of Detroit, MI, and Windsor, Ontario, were both supported by 
automobile-production during the early-to mid-20th century, however the U.S. side has 
since removed the motor industry, sparking its decline. Conversely, the Canadian city left 
the industry intact and added more incentives to grow the population and economy. While 
the population of Windsor is 336 thousand, Detroit’s population nearly doubles that of 
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Windsor at 667 thousand residents.230 In 2010, the unemployment rate of Detroit was 14.8 
percent compared to the 9.6 percent national average.231 Outsourcing the automotive 
industry crippled Detroit’s economic sector and population since the 1950s, but Windsor 
has continued to grow its populace by over 50 percent over the same 70-year span 
beginning in 1950.232 Contrary to Detroit, Windsor left the motor industry intact while 
developing the industrial and agrarian sectors of the region to attract immigrants. Ranked 
as Canada’s third fastest-growing city in 2019, Windsor is drawing regional and 
international attention due to a growing job market and lower costs of living. These factors 
appeal not only to Canadian citizens living in high-cost urbanized centers like the greater 
Toronto area, but also the immigration sector, “which also includes non-permanent 
students and foreign workers.”233 As Detroit continues to recover from its 2013 largest-
ever municipal bankruptcy, Windsor continues to provide the incoming populace a 
balanced economy with room to grow. 
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The two methods of crossing this U.S.-Canada port of entry includes the Windsor Tunnel 
and the Ambassador Bridge, which hold world records as the only international sub-
aqueous vehicle crossing and the biggest international suspension bridge. 
Figure 26. Detroit-Windsor Border Map.234 
The Blaine, WA and Douglas, British Columbia port of entry is the third-busiest 
entry control point at the U.S.-Canada border. In 2019, over four million crossings occurred 
at the two north-western Washington crossings.235 The first, known as the Peace Arch 
crossing, is located on Interstate 5 along the Puget Sound, and the second, named the 
 
234 Source: Detroit-Windsor border map, Google Maps, accessed July 22, 2020, 
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Blaine-Douglas crossing, extends along the Highway 15 corridor.236 Traffic separation at 
the border crossings is quite simple. While the easternmost crossing manages personal 
vehicles, busses, and commercial transportation, the Peace Arch crossing prohibits 
commercial vehicles, as shown in Figure 27.237 
Although the Peace Arch border crossing only allows for personal vehicle and bus 
admittance, traffic ballooning remains a problem. The border control point can have wait 
times of up to four hours during peak hours, and those who intend to cross during those 
hours are advised to use alternate crossings such as Blaine-Douglas or Lynden-
Aldergrove.238 Contrarily, the Blaine-Douglas port of entry average wait times range 
between five to fifteen minutes.239 Efficiency at the Blaine-Douglas entry point can be 
attributed to programs focused on safe and secure expeditious border traffic processing 
such as FAST, Ready Lane, and NEXUS.240 A vulnerability of this international entry 
point is the heavy wait times at the Peace Arch border crossing. If wait times continue to 
increase, causing traffic spillover at Blaine-Douglas and Lynden-Aldergrove border 
crossings, those control points might also become oversaturated by heavy traffic volumes. 
The cities of Blaine, WA and Douglas, British Columbia rely on an economy 
known for sightseeing, the retail industry, and commercial traffic. While the population in 
Blaine is nearly six thousand residents, the population of Douglas in Surrey British 
Columbia is 517 thousand people.241 Those living in Blaine refer to the city as “The 
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Gateway to the Pacific Northwest” due to its geographic location, which provides the 
means of transit from Canada to Seattle, WA.242 The city has become a retail destination 
for Canadian citizens who travel from the suburbs of Vancouver. In 2018, Canada shoppers 
accounted for $140 million of retail purchasing in Whatcom County, the county where 
Blaine is located.243 Canadians also travel to the U.S. for vacationing, family visits, and 
picking up mail and online purchases.244 Another marketing research study also examined 
U.S. citizens who travel to British Columbia. At least one-third of Washington residents 
surveyed had visited British Columbia, with the popular destinations being Vancouver, the 
Greater Vancouver Regional District, and the Fraser Valley, and the top reasons included 
shopping, sightseeing, and hiking.245 In 2006, Tourism Vancouver reported that U.S. 
residents visiting the Greater Vancouver region contributed to $4.5 billion of revenue, and 
distribution of funds went to “accommodation (31.8%), food and beverage (26.0%), retail 
(19.0%), private transportation (8.8%), recreation and entertainment (9.2%), and public 
transportation (5.2%).”246 In sum, the Peace Arch crossing and the Blaine-Douglas 
crossing act as a commercial transportation, retail, and tourism medium between the U.S. 
and Canada. 
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The entry control point is split into two, the first being the Peace Arch crossing, and second 
the Blaine-Douglas crossing. The major difference is that commercial trucking is only 
permitted through the Blaine-Douglas crossing. 
Figure 27. Blaine-Douglas Border Map.247 
The Port Huron, MI and Point Edward, Ontario entry control point is located at the 
southernmost point of Lake Huron, 57 miles northeast of the Detroit-Windsor border 
crossing, as seen in Figure 28. In 2019, with over 2 million border crossings over the St. 
Clair River on the arch cantilever Blue Water Bridge, this point of entry is the fourth busiest 
international crossing at the U.S.-Canada border.248 In the past only one Blue Water Bridge 
 
247 Source: Blaine-Douglas border map, Google Maps, accessed July 22, 2020, 
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existed, which gave eastbound and westbound traffic three lanes to manipulate for traffic 
flow. In November 1999, a second Blue Water Bridge was opened for operation, giving a 
total of six lanes for U.S.-bound and Canada-bound traffic.249 A concern at this entry point 
is the amount of traffic the Canada-bound inspection lanes process. The 13 CBP inspection 
booths manage “more traffic per inspection booth than at any other Canada-U.S. border 
crossing.”250 Ballooning mitigation is practically non-existent because the Blue Water 
Bridge is the only land border crossing point for nearly 60 miles. This fact demonstrates 
the importance of transportation programs, such as FAST and NEXUS, to increase 
throughput while maintaining a secure entry control point. 
The cities of Port Huron, MI and Point Edward, Ontario are relatively small 
communities that are heavily reliant on the tourism industry. While Port Huron has a 
population of nearly 29-thousand residents, the small town of Point Edward has two 
thousand occupants.251 With the international bridge bringing U.S. and Canadian traffic 
through the region, both cities have economies reliant on tourism. Port Huron’s economy 
is also supported through the production of paper and metal.252 The St. Clair River 
industrial shipping dock, locally known as The Bean Dock, ceased industrial operations in 
2003 but continues to use the pier for cruise liners, resupplying ships, and foreign 
vessels.253 Point Edward, however, is solely reliant on tourism and the commercial 
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industry, including the 2000 opening of the Charity Casino, since the 1980s industrial 
decline.254 
 
Two bridges running side-by-side orchestrated 2 milling crossings last year, and the 
Canada-bound inspection booths inspect more traffic than any other U.S.-Canada port of 
entry. 
Figure 28. Port Huron-Point Edward Border Map.255 
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The Champlain-Rouses Point entry control point resides at the intersection of New 
York, Vermont, and 30 miles south of Montreal, as seen in Figure 29. Although the 
townships in the area only account for five thousand residents combined, the region still 
manages the fifth most crossings at the U.S.-Canada border.256 In 2019, over 300 thousand 
buses, personal vehicles, trucks, and trains crossed this border control point (the U.S. 
Bureau of Transportation combines crossing totals for both Champlain-Blackpool and 
Rouses Point-Lacolle).257 The primary border control point between Champlain, NY and 
Saint-Bernard, Quebec, is a major thoroughfare from Quebec to New York and has recently 
expanded to increased capacity in response to higher volumes of shipping traffic.258 To 
understand the amount of traffic the crossing accounts for, “on average, more than 15,000 
commercial vehicles use the crossing weekly.”259 Moreover, the Champlain and Saint-
Bernard crossing ranks sixth in commercial traffic and eleventh in passenger traffic at the 
U.S.-Canada border, and is responsible for $14 billion in international commerce.260 In 
2008, the Quebec government ministry Transports Québec began using radar to detect 
traffic line length, calculate wait times, and display the times on variable message signs, 
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257 Bureau of Transportation Statistics Database “Border Crossing Entry Data: 2019 Ranking.” The 
U.S. Department of Transportation 2019 total accounts for only buses, personal vehicles, and trucks 
regardless of trailers being empty or full.  
258 Matt Cutler and Isaac Carey, “Trade Rout: As Trade Tensions Built Between U.S. and Canada, 
this American Border Town Felt the Freeze,” City University of New York Capstone, December 16, 2018, 
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1303&context=gj_etds. 
259 “I-87 Multimodal Corridor Study- Existing Corridor Conditions and Opportunities,” New York 
State, accessed October 16, 2020, https://www.dot.ny.gov/programs/i-87-multimodal-corridor-study/
repository/chapter_2-9_us-canadian_border_crossing.pdf. This total includes northbound and southbound 
crossings. 
260 New York State, “I-87 Multimodal Corridor Study- Existing Corridor Conditions and 
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which helped in creating traffic transparency.261 As mentioned in the following paragraph, 
if those crossing are unwilling to wait the time allotted on the displays, the Rouses Point-
Lacolle port of entry is an alternative route, which assists in easing the ballooning effect at 
these borderlands. However, one regional study shows that “extended queues frequently 
occur on the Canadian side of the border.”262 Congestion is created by the large amounts 
of international goods and personal vehicle traffic. Although two border entry points are 
present, heavy traffic demonstrates a vulnerability that will likely increase as cross border 
economic demands are not expected to subside. 
The eastern-most crossing in the region, Rouses Point, New York and Lacolle, 
Quebec, sit on the west bank of the Richelieu River and is commonly transited by locals 
when the Champlain crossing is experiencing long wait times.263 Moreover, one-mile east 
of the Rouses Point-Lacolle crossing is a third international crossing between Canada and 
the U.S., and is named the Cantic Station. Both entry points use two inspection lanes on 
each side of the border, which provides minimum alleviation to traffic congestion. Since 
these border entry points are primarily used by local traffic and during long wait times at 
the Champlain and Saint-Bernard crossing, having only two inspection booths are 
sufficient for the small communities of Rouses Point, NY and Lacolle, Quebec. 
Industry in the region is quite diverse when examining the cities on each side of the 
U.S.-Canada border. The New York cities of Champlain and Rouses Point are 
economically dependent on the following industries: municipalities, manufacturing, retail 
trade, agriculture, forestry, and fishing and hunting.264 As for Quebec’s cities of Lacolle 
 
261 Jonathan Sabean and Crystal Jones, “Inventory of Current Programs for Measuring Wait Times at 
Land Border Crossings,” Transport Canada and Federal Highway Administration, May 21, 2008, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.511.694&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
262New York State, “I-87 Multimodal Corridor Study- Existing Corridor Conditions and 
Opportunities.” 
263 “Rouses Point / Lacolle,” EZbordercrossing, accessed October 16, 2020, 
https://www.ezbordercrossing.com/list-of-border-crossings/new-york/rouses-point/. 
264 “Rouses Point, NY: Census Place,” Data USA, accessed October 23, 2020, https://datausa.io/
profile/geo/rouses-point-ny. 
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and Saint-Bernard, the leading industries are construction, manufacturing, agriculture, 
forestry, retail trade, transportation, and warehousing.265 
 
The Champlain-Saint Bernard and Rouses Point-Lacolle ports of entry account for over 
15-thousand commercial vehicles weekly and $14 billion in international commerce. 
Figure 29. Champlain-Rouses Point Border Map.266 
 
265 Statistics Canada, “Census Profile, 2016 Census: Saint-Bernard.” 
266 Source: Champlain-Rouses Point border map, Google Maps, accessed July 22, 2020, 
https://www.google.com/maps/@44.9899742,-73.4282321,12.67z. 
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D. BORDER SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 
The CBP and the Canada Border Services Agency work closely to provide a secure 
border while allowing both nations continued economic prosperity through efficient cross-
border travel. At the U.S.-Canada border, security technologies include physical sensors 
and equipment, and bilateral border programs that use technology to reduce wait times. 
The equipment in use at the international boundary includes radar towers with thermal 
imagery to detect illegal crossings, Radio Frequency Identification technology license plate 
readers, radiation portal monitors for detecting the presence of radiation in trucks and 
personal vehicles, biometric technology, and unmanned aircraft for targeting threats in 
border regions.267 The border programs used to expedite traffic at entry control points 
include NEXUS and FAST. The NEXUS program is exclusive to the U.S.-Canada border 
for passenger vehicles at land ports of entry, and the FAST border program is used for 
commercial traffic entering the U.S.268 Like the border programs used at the U.S.-Mexico 
border, these entry programs use information system technologies to store personally 
identifiable information and biometrics to identify a person before allowing entry into the 
U.S. 
The combination of different topographies and different types of weather warrant 
the use of these physical technologies for border security are found throughout the U.S.-
Canada border region. For instance, the CBP use UAVs (e.g. MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 
Reaper, and RQ-7B Shadow) to monitor over 1,000 miles of U.S.-Canada border territory, 
specifically regions stretching from the Pacific Ocean to Minnesota, and across the 
northern territories of New York.269 These unmanned aircraft use “synthetic-aperture radar 
 
267 “Northern Border Strategy,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 2012, 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/policy/dhs-northern-border-strategy.pdf; George Richert, “Border 
Patrol Radar Towers Watch Lake Erie From Sturgeon Point, Dunkirk,” KIVB 4 Buffalo News, February 6, 
2020, https://www.wivb.com/news/border-patrol-radar-towers-watch-lake-erie-from-sturgeon-point-
dunkirk/; Mark B. Salter, and Geneviève Piché, “The Securitization of the US–Canada Border in American 
Political Discourse,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (March 2012): 933, https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0008423911000813; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Say Hello to the New Face of Speed 
Security and Safety: Introducing Biometric Facial Comparison,” accessed on November 7, 2020, 
https://www.biometrics.cbp.gov/.  
268 U.S. Department of Homeland Defense, “Trusted Traveler Programs.” 
269 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Border Security Results.” 
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imagery and full-motion video to aid in surveilling the border.”270 Synthetic aperture radar 
imagery used by CBP drones transmits and receives and stores a series of short pulse 
returns, “the radar can synthesize the equivalent of a linear array long enough to provide 
azimuth resolution as fine as a foot or so.”271 A major benefit of using these synthesized 
radar arrays is that imaging can be produced at night, through cloud cover and fog, and 
even through smoke. Moving objects in the image are blurry due to rotational motion, 
which provides CBP agents items to view closer with the UAVs full-motion video. 
The benefits of UAV technology in the region include its capability of traveling 
over large distances or concentrating in an area of interest for surveillance purposes. To 
illustrate where these drone technologies are employed, a database released by Gizmodo 
has mapped drone flight paths along the U.S.-Canada border region, identifying the CBP 
drones used in the area, routes travelled, and locations that are highly transited. The UAV 
tail numbers and platform types that have transited the United States’ northern border since 
June 2019 (Gizmodo database start date) include MQ-9 Predator B drones CBP 104 and 
CBP 216.272 The area that contained the most drone flights, seen in Figure 30, exhibits the 
two CBP drone routes from June 10, 2019 to June 4, 2020 that occurred exclusively at the 
U.S.-Canada border regions of Montana, North Dakota, and Minnesota, originating along 
the I-29 corridor between the North Dakota cities of Pembina and Grand Forks, roughly 
73-miles north of Fargo.273 These flight paths demonstrate the CBP’s aerial surveillance 
focus in the northeastern region of North Dakota and portions of northwestern Minnesota. 
 
270 Eoin Higgins, “US Border Patrol Denounced as ‘Rogue Agency’ for Using Predator Drone to Spy 
on Minneapolis Protests,” Common Dreams, May 29, 2020, https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/
05/29/us-border-patrol-denounced-rogue-agency-using-predator-drone-spy-minneapolis. 
271 George W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar. 2nd ed. (Mendham, New Jersey: SciTech 
Publishing, 1998), 13. 
272 Gizmodo/Earth Engine Drone Flight Logs, unpublished data, accessed November 7, 2020, 
https://dhruvmehrotra3.users.earthengine.app/view/drones. 
273 Gizmodo/Earth Engine Drone Flight Logs, unpublished data. 
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From 2019 to 2020, this area was the most transited by CBP drones than any other U.S.-
Canada border area. 
Figure 30. U.S. Drone Use in North Dakota and Minnesota.274 
A new and innovative technology for border surveillance on the U.S.-Canada 
border is the Slash CameraPole Pilot program.275 Designed to operate in the “Slash,” a 20-
foot-wide and 1,349-mile-long area along the U.S.-Canada border, the DHS and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology have created a sensor disguised as a light pole to 
conduct surveillance at the border. Installed equipment on a single Slash CameraPole 
include thermal sensors, four infrared cameras, solar panels, a fuel cell system, motion 
detection algorithms, and a hardened exterior capable of sustaining rounds from small 
arms.276 These sensors then send data to a central command center for further analysis by 
 
274 Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Border Security Results.”; North Dakota/
Minnesota-Canada border map, Google Maps, accessed November 9, 2020, https://www.google.com/
maps/@47.7539336,-96.856058,7.03z. 
275 “Snapshot: Protecting our Northern Border with the Slash CameraPole,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, January 30, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/01/30/
snapshot-protecting-our-northern-border-slash-camerapole. 
276 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Snapshot: Protecting our Northern Border with the Slash 
CameraPole.” 
96 
border agents. The pilot program is being tested in the Swan Sector of Vermont, New 
Hampshire, and New York, and was recently acquired by CBP. Slash CameraPoles might 
become the new norm for U.S.-Canada border security surveillance along the 1,349-mile 
corridor. 
E. REGIONAL STABILITY 
A contributor to U.S.-Canada regional stability is the relationship between 
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and U.S. President Trump on migration. Executive 
Orders 13769 and 13780 have reduced the admittance of refugees into the U.S. and 
“restricted migration from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.”277 Prime 
Minister Trudeau responded to the United States’ orders on Twitter with a statement about 
foreign inclusion, which placed a barrier between Canadian and U.S. migration policy: “To 
those fleeing persecution, terror [and] war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your 
faith. Diversity is our strength.”278 With nearly 400,000 shares, the Canadian message 
resonated around the world. 
Prime Minister Trudeau was invited to Washington, DC, the month after President 
Trump signed Executive Order 13769, for a meeting with the U.S. President. Although the 
opposing views were never directly acknowledged, Prime Minister Trudeau stated during 
a press conference that “we had a very strong and fruitful discussion [regarding U.S.-
Canada security and immigration systems].”279 Although these ideals focusing on 
migration do not directly influence regional stability at the U.S.-Canada border, a bordering 
nation-state foreign policy does impact binational cooperation and border region stability. 
 
277 Exec. Order No. 13769 (January 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/
executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states/; Exec. Order No. 13780 (March 6, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-
terrorist-entry-united-states-2/; Benjamin J. Muller and Bonnie Lynn Guthrie, “Collateral Damage: The 
Canada-US Border and President Trump’s Executive Orders,” American Review of Canadian Studies 50, 
no. 1 (June 2020): 111–3, DOI: 10.1080/02722011.2020.1743006. 
278 Justin Trudeau (@JustinTrudeau), “To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will 
welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength #WelcomeToCanada,” Twitter, January 8, 
2017, 12:20 p.m., https://twitter.com/JustinTrudeau/status/825438460265762816. 
279 “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada in Joint Press Conference,” 
The White House, February 13, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-prime-minister-trudeau-canada-joint-press-conference/. 
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Furthermore, with 80 percent of Canada’s populace located at least 60 miles from the U.S. 
border, Canadian citizens have an undeniably close relationship with the U.S.-Canada 
border.280 Results of migration differences between the U.S. and Canada have echoed 
through the Canadian populace. Canadian’s are generally inclined to view “their country’s 
immigration system more positively than their counterparts in the United States.”281 
Canada’s outlook may not contribute to instability at the U.S.-Canada borderlands, but it 
could lead to discontent between both nation-states’ views on immigration, especially if 
the U.S. is unwilling to assist in Canada’s goal to provide basic human rights for those 
seeking refuge. 
Another lens of U.S.-Canada regional stability comes from an international 
perspective of commerce exchanges and lifestyle equality between both nations at the 
international boundary. Other nations describe the borderland relationship between the 
U.S. and Canada as “a place of exchange for trade.”282 Although the attacks of New York 
in 1993 and 2001 have placed international attention on U.S. border security measures, the 
economic cooperation between the U.S. and Canada still reign as the primary attribute. The 
lack of Canadian citizens entering illegally is a major contributor to the United States’ 
border security. Due to economic success and high standards of living of our northern 
neighbors, Canadians are not necessarily searching for ways to enter the U.S. for 
employment or an improved lifestyle; contrary to the southern border of U.S.-Mexico 
known for the United States’ efforts to suppress immigration.283 
 
280 Salter and Piché, “The Securitization of the US–Canada Border in American Political Discourse.” 
281 Amelia Cheatham, “What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy?” Council on Foreign Relations, 
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282 Hélène Pellerin, “Borders, Migration and Economic Integration: Towards a New Political 
Economy of Borders,” In Global Surveillance and Policing, ed. by Elia Zureik and Mark Salter (Portland, 
OR: Willan, 2005), 52. 
283 David B. Carter and Paul Poast, “Why do states build walls? Political economy, security, and 
border stability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (September 2015): 244, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0022002715596776. 
98 
F. CONCLUSION 
The U.S.-Canada border region evolved from the late-18th century until the mid-
19th century through a series of diplomatic agreements, specifically the Treaty of Paris, the 
Louisiana Purchase, and the Oregon Treaty. Since the border’s final adjustments in 1846, 
both nations have helped build each other’s economic sector without interference until 
recent events demonstrated the potential threats of a porous border. Due to the terrorist 
events of 1993, 1999, and ultimately 2001, the national security objectives have 
emphasized the “dual objectives of security and facilitation.”284 Border programs such as 
Beyond the Border and LRMA were created and implemented, and overseen through the 
binational security forces of BEST and IBET to achieve the objective of streamlining 
commerce without sacrificing security. Access points along the U.S-Canada border have 
benefited from these programs’ focus on pre-screening and from the border surveillance 
technologies that contribute as border agent force multipliers as evidence by the minimal 
wait times at the top-five U.S.-Canada ports of entry and the decreased terrorist activity in 
the border regions. 
However, one major concern of both nations are the differing views on migration. 
While Canadian administration demonstrates a liberal approach for the inclusion of people 
fleeing failed states, the United States’ executive branch has placed stricter guidance on 
the national immigration policy. Regardless of these differences in international inclusion, 
the U.S.-Canada border is arguably the most stable region of the three discussed 
borderlands due to its integrated security, cooperative border management programs, and 
the positive living conditions for both nations. 
 
284 Salter and Piché, “The Securitization of the US–Canada Border in American Political Discourse,” 
941. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis explores the unilateral smart borders connecting Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, and Paraguay, the smart border between the United States and Mexico, and the 
smart border between the United States and Canada. The Argentina case study examines a 
border region that, concerned with illegal crossings at northern borders, had recently 
adopted border surveillance equipment for illegal crossing detection. The United States and 
Mexico case study demonstrates a region with the most border surveillance technologies 
of the three smart borders, as seen in Figure 22, yet is plagued with failing border security 
policies. The U.S.-Mexico borderland illustrates the notion that border technologies do not 
create regional stability. The United States and Canada case study displays an international 
boundary focused on the flow of trade while maintaining a secure border. Enormous 
amounts of border technology are in use at this border, not only for surveillance purposes, 
but also for the efficient flow of commerce. 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
After only one year of smart border technology testing in Argentina, the advantages 
and disadvantages are still unclear. However, with the implementation of smart borders at 
the U.S. and Mexico and the U.S. and Canada borderlands at least a decade old, the benefits 
and detriments are visible. Border security technologies such as sensors and systems of 
multiple sensors are force multipliers while cooperative binational border security 
programs facilitate security and trade. For example, the magnitude of a system that includes 
inter-connected sensors broadcasting real-time surveillance data to a command and control 
center creates a massive advantage for border patrol organizations who are responsible for 
homeland security. Over-relying on information systems and privacy-invasive surveillance 
technologies, however, does contribute to instability through information system 
vulnerabilities and the infringement of national rights. For instance, catastrophic damages 
would occur if hostile actors breached information systems and could consequently expose 
millions of peoples’ personally identifiable information, biometric data, and proprietary 
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government information, or could manipulate database results to allow or restrict access to 
travelers. 
In sum, there is not a direct link between smart border management and stability 
(or instability) in the Western Hemisphere. However, failing states compound instability 
in adjacent regions with a border security focus. National security concerns produced by 
migration flows and drug trafficking account for the largest variables between two of the 
three smart borders. These concerns, however, do not necessarily have a direct relationship 
with the strength of border security technologies. The borders of Argentina-Bolivia and 
U.S.-Mexico have similar traffic patterns caused by disparities in economic and living 
conditions, which is contrary to the U.S.-Canada border region that demonstrates similar 
economic levels and living conditions. This does not necessarily prove a direct link 
between security and economic variances amongst neighboring states, which cause 
migration flows, trafficking, and instability in the borderlands, but the three case studies of 
U.S. and Mexico; U.S. and Canada; and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay do 
exhibit an association between the two variables. For instance, the average living 
conditions and economy of Argentina are more stable than that of Bolivia which recently 
experienced a political coup. Furthermore, life in the U.S. when compared to Mexico is 
considerably more stable when examining crime rates, average living conditions, and 
national economic strength. Contrarily, the disparity between variables when comparing 
the U.S. and Canada are minimal; both economies are stable, living conditions and 
infrastructure are paramount, and basic human rights of the populace are met. In total, 
borders are easier to manage when bordering nations have similar living and economic 
conditions, even if they are smart. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although this research focuses solely on three smart borders and border 
deployments used in those regions, researching other borderlands that plan to utilize (or 
have demonstrated) smart border technologies and policies (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, Uruguay) can assist in analyzing 
contributions of border security technologies to stability and instability, and could help 
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pinpoint similar or alternative reasons for variance.285 Although the three cases point to a 
correlation between border instability and adjacent state inequalities, rather than to a 
correlation between border stability and border security technology, analyzing other 
nations with shared borders might reveal more refined findings with this framework. 
As command and control centers continue to analyze enormous swaths of border 
surveillance data, sorting and deciphering large quantities of information is essential for 
efficient operations. Future research that explores the possibilities of artificial intelligence 
integration into these data pools could determine if such technologies can provide 
progressive data processing solutions for a data-saturated environment. The ability to filter 
pertinent surveillance data from irrelevant information would contribute to heightened 
border security awareness. 
Lastly, given the intrusive nature of border security surveillance technologies, 
future research could investigate potential national policies and practices that could protect 
the rights of a populace, while still executing the mission of border security. This could 
include information purge agreements that require the deletion of archived surveillance 
data not considered essential to homeland security, and policies that prohibit border 
surveillance information from becoming public domain. Also, populations should have a 
voice—through voting—about how their borders are monitored and the governing policies 
of surveilled data, by expanding voting rights for populations residing within border 
regions utilizing smart border technologies. These changes would help bridge the gap 
between concerns of the populace and privacy violations, and border management and 
national security. 
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